Logical Empiricism and Psychiatric Classification Michael Alan Schwartz and Osborne P. Wiggins Nosology has become a widely discussed topic in psychiatry with the appearance of DSM-III. Most current treatments of diagnostic categorization, however, presuppose a particular philosophy of science: logical empiricism. Ideas of Carl G. Hempel, a leading proponent of logical empiricism. can be shown to illuminate the contemporary classification of mental disorders. Moreover, the importance attached by many prominent psychiatrists to operational definitions in nosology can be seen to grow from logical empiricist roots. Even the etiology of mental disorders can be placed within a logical empiricist framework. We describe this logical empiricist position in order to prepare for alternative approaches to classification. @I 1986 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA by Grune & Stratton, Inc. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIH A FTER DECADES OF NEGLECT by American psychiatrists, nosology is now receiving much attention. This resurgence of interest in nosology stems from the appearance of DSM-III.’ The bold departures from the protocols of DSM- II2 and ICD-93 undertaken in DSM-III have also inspired animated controversies and impassioned debates.“6 These controversies and debates are already influencing the ongoing midway revision of DSM-III. Furthermore, they will strongly shape the upcoming preparations for ICD-10 and DSM-IV.’ Many of these discussions, while reviving an interest in nosology, tend to focus more on the innovations peculiar to DSM-III.4 Other contributions have made us increasingly aware of the underlying complexities of psychiatric nosology.8-‘0 In this growing literature, the discussions of psychiatric taxonomy are frequently guided by an approach that emphasizes description, remains close to observable data, values reliability, and operationalizes terminology. Such an approach suggests the influence, however implicit, of a particular philosophy of science: logical empiricism. Yet it is not often recalled that twenty-five years ago Carl G. Hempel, the preeminent representative of logical empiricism, was invited by the American Psychopathological Association to explicate the basic issues of classification in psychiatry.” This occurred seven years after the appearance of DSM-II2 and nine years prior to the publication of DSM-II.2 Hempel performed this task with his customary thoroughness and precision, and his paper remains today a classic in the philosophical literature. In addition to explicating and defending the position of logical empiricism, Hempel later criticized alternative approaches to the issues of classification and conceptualization in empirical science. I3 In particular, he rejected Max Weber’s methodology for the study of human life. I4 And, as a matter of historical fact, Hempel’s position has won the day and Weber’s has been completely overlooked in efforts such as DSM-III. Ironically, Karl Jaspers’GeneruZ PsychopathoZogy’5 was deeply shaped by Weber’s methodology, and Jaspers’ orientation is today a major From the Department of Psychiatry, St Vincent’s Hospital and Medical Center of New York, New York Medical College and the Department of Philosophy, New School for Social Research, New York Address reprint request to Michael Alan Schwartz, M. D., Department of Psychiatry, St Vincent’s Hospital and Medical Center of New York, New York Medical College, 203 W est 12th St, Room 606, New York, NY 10011. @ 1986 by Grune t Stratton, Inc. 001&440X/86/2 702- ooO2$03.00/0 Comprehensive Psychiatry, Vol. 27, No. 2, (March/April) 1966: pp 101-l 14 101