Understanding Russia’s Soft Power Strategy Alexander Sergunin St Petersburg State University/Higher School of Economics Leonid Karabeshkin Euroacademy, Tallinn, Estonia This article examines the specifics of Moscow’s soft power strategy. The sources of the Kremlin’s interest in the soft power concept are explained. The article discusses how the soft power concept fits in the current Russian foreign policy philosophy. Russia’s soft power resources, institutions and instruments are described. Special attention is given to the limitations and constraints of Moscow’s soft power strategies. The reasons why these strategies are often being inefficient are explained. The Kremlin’s inclination to the combination of the soft and hard power strategies is identified. Keywords: Russia; soft power; Kremlin; foreign policy Introduction It has become commonplace to claim that in the post-Cold War era key international players often prefer to exercise soft rather than hard power. According to those who have adopted the soft power concept, economic, socio-cultural, institutional and legal instruments are more efficient in the present-day world than military strength or direct political and economic pressure. In their view, for many nations, hard power has become an exceptional tool and a last resort in foreign relations rather than day-to-day practice. Hard power is now mainly applicable to those international actors who violate international law or directly threaten national, regional or global security. Since the mid-2000s, Russia has attempted to develop a soft power concept and an imple- mentation mechanism of its own. The idea of soft power was formally introduced into Russian foreign policy doctrine in 2013 and top Russian leaders (including President Vladimir Putin) have declared that soft power instruments are the most important ones in Moscow’s foreign policy arsenal. However, Moscow has repeatedly used hard power instruments in the post- Soviet space over the last decade – most recently in the cases of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014–2015. Such actions are dissonant with Russia’s officially proclaimed adherence to non-violent foreign policy methods. Russia’s soft power strategy is a relatively new theme in the academic literature and remains noticeably under-researched. Several categories addressing this topic can be identified. First, some studies, mainly of an historical character, have focused on the alleged continuity of Russia’s present-day soft power strategies with Soviet-type propaganda or even Russia’s pre-revolutionary foreign policies (Tsygankov, 2013a and 2013b). POLITICS: 2015 VOL 35(3-4), 347–363 doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12109 © 2015 The Authors. Politics © 2015 Political Studies Association