Journal of Cognitive Systems Research 1 (2000) 65–75 www.elsevier.com / locate / cogsys Information and representation in autonomous agents Action editor: Ron Sun * Mark H. Bickhard Cognitive Science, 17 Memorial Drive East, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015, USA Accepted 13 August 1999 Abstract Information and representation are thought to be intimately related. Representation, in fact, is commonly considered to be a special kind of information. It must be a special kind, because otherwise all of the myriad instances of informational relationships in the universe would be representational — some restrictions must be placed on informational relationships in order to refine the vast set into those that are truly representational. I will argue that information in this general sense is important to genuine agents, but that it is a blind alley with regard to the attempt to understand representation. On the other hand, I will also argue that a different, quite non-standard, form of information is central to genuine representation. First, I turn to some of the reasons why information as usually considered is the wrong category for understanding representation; second, to an alternative model of representation — one that is naturally emergent in autonomous agents, and that does involve information, but not in standard form; and third, I return to standard notions of informational relationships and show what they are in fact useful for.  2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. Information and representation are thought to be haps some sort of structural relationship must hold as intimately related. Representation, in fact, is com- an aspect of the informational relationship, such as monly considered to be a special kind of infor- the isomorphism requirement of the Physical Symbol mation. It must be a special kind, because otherwise System Hypothesis (Newell, 1980; Vera & Simon, all of the myriad instances of informational relation- 1993). Perhaps some special training is required to ships in the universe would be representational — have established the informational relationship, such some restrictions must be placed on informational as for connectionist nets (McClelland & Rumelhart, relationships in order to refine the vast set into those 1986; Rumelhart, 1989; Rumelhart & McClelland, that are truly representational (Smith, 1987, 1995). 1986). Perhaps the informational relationship must be causal I will argue that information in this general sense in origin, or perhaps it must be an instance of a is important to genuine agents, but that it is a blind nomological relationship (Fodor, 1987, 1990a,b, alley with regard to the attempt to understand 1998; Levine & Bickhard, 1999). Perhaps even representation. On the other hand, I will also argue broader informational relationships will do if some that a different, quite non-standard, form of in- special history obtains (Dretske, 1981, 1988). Per- formation is central to genuine representation. First, I turn to some of the reasons why information as usually considered is the wrong category for under- *URL: http: / / www.lehigh.edu / | mhb0 / mhb0.html. E-mail address: mhb0@lehigh.edu (M.H. Bickhard) standing representation; second, to an alternative 1389-0417 / 00 / $ – see front matter  2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII: S1389-0417(99)00007-8