International Journal of Drug Policy 21 (2010) 265–270 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect International Journal of Drug Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/drugpo Policy Analysis Illicit drugs policy through the lens of regulation Alison Ritter a,b,* a Drug Policy Modelling Program, UNSW, Australia b Regulatory Institutions Network, The ANU, Australia article info Article history: Received 23 May 2009 Received in revised form 14 September 2009 Accepted 8 November 2009 Keywords: Regulation Policy Self-regulation Market regulation Governance abstract The application of regulatory theory to the problem of illicit drugs has generally been thought about only in terms of ‘command and control’. The international treaties governing global illicit drug control and the use of law enforcement to dissuade and punish offenders have been primary strategies. In this paper I explore the application of other aspects of regulatory theory to illicit drugs—primarily self-regulation and market regulation. There has been an overreliance on strategies from the top of the regulatory pyramid. Two other regulatory strategies – self-regulation and market regulation – can be applied to illicit drugs. Self-regulation, driven by the proactive support of consumer groups may reduce drug-related harms. Market strategies such as pill-testing can change consumer preferences and encourage alternate seller behaviour. Regulatory theory is also concerned with partnerships between the state and third parties: strategies in these areas include partnerships between police and pharmacies regarding sale of potential precursor chemicals. Regulatory theory and practice is a rich and well-developed field in the social sci- ences. I argue that governments should consider the full array of regulatory strategies. Using regulatory theory provides a rationale and justification to strategies that are currently at the whim of politics, such as funding for user groups. The greater application of regulatory approaches may produce more flexible and structured illicit drug policies. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Introduction This paper examines regulatory theory and how it can be used both as an explanatory framework for illicit drug interventions and as an opportunity to explore alternate drug policy interven- tions. Regulatory theory can provide a coherent framework and rationale for certain government actions, such as self-regulation or market regulation, that currently occur on an ad hoc basis which leaves them vulnerable to political whim. In this paper, I describe the regulatory theory, and examine three aspects as they apply to illicit drugs: self-regulation, market regulation, and harnessing non-state actors. Examples of interventions consistent with the theory are provided and the paper concludes with exploration of other interventions that are consistent with regulatory theory but yet to receive much government attention. The regulatory theory described herein comes from socio-legal and criminology fields, as reflected in the work of Braithwaite, Gra- bosky, Wood and others (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Braithwaite, Healy, & Dwan, 2005; Grabosky * Correspondence address: Drug Policy Modelling Program, National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of NSW, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia. Tel.: +61 2 9385 0236; fax: +61 2 9385 0222. E-mail address: Alison.ritter@unsw.edu.au. & Braithwaite, 1986, 1993; Gunningham & Grabosky, 1998; Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005; Shearing, 2006; Wood & Dupont, 2006). The application of this regulatory approach has spanned tax law, criminal justice interventions, occupational health and safety, and policing and security. In the narrowest sense, regulation is the strategies and actions of government to steer the economy and to govern through rules. The purpose of regulation is the abate- ment or control of risks to society and to protect the public good (Braithwaite et al., 2005). Much regulation scholarship especially that defined from this narrow perspective has focussed on its role in shaping market outcomes, and the use of economic instruments, such as taxes and charges, subsidies and exemptions, tradeable permits, and advertising codes. Regulatory theory arose during a time of changing perspectives on the role of government, in addition to globalisation and the decline of the welfare state. The new regulatory state has been char- acterised by privatisation, and the notion of the role of the state as the ‘purchaser’ of services, and non-state actors as ‘providers’. An increased reliance on markets and market principles, alongside increased investment in state regulation of these privatised ser- vices/resources has occurred. These developments were consistent with the changing role of government: less rowing more steering (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). These changes in the role of government and the narrow def- inition of regulation have not been without criticism, notably 0955-3959/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2009.11.002