MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Vol. 50, No. 11, November 2004, pp. 1534–1544
issn 0025-1909 eissn 1526-5501 04 5011 1534
inf orms
®
doi 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0210
©2004 INFORMS
Effects of Adaptive Behaviors and Shared Mental
Models on Control Crew Performance
Mary J. Waller
A. B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University, 7 McAlister Drive, New Orleans, Louisiana 70118, mwaller1@tulane.edu
Naina Gupta
Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 1206 South Sixth Street,
Champaign, Illinois 61820, ngupta@uiuc.edu
Robert C. Giambatista
College of Business Administration, Texas Tech University, P.O. Box 42101, Lubbock, Texas 79409-2101,
rgiambatista@ba.ttu.edu
C
ontrol crews are highly trained teams responsible for monitoring complex systems, performing routine
procedures, and quickly responding to nonroutine situations. Previous literature suggests that higher-
performing control crews engage in adaptive behavior during high-workload or crisis situations. Other work
suggeststhathigher-performingcrewsuseperiodsoflowerworkloadstoprepareforfutureproblems.Tounder-
stand which behaviors performed during which situations better differentiate lower- from higher-performing
crews, we conducted a study of 14 nuclear power plant control room crews and examined adaptive behaviors
and shared mental model development in the crews as they faced monitoring, routine, and nonroutine situa-
tions.Ourresultssuggestthatfewdifferencesinadaptivebehaviorsexistbetweenhigher-andlower-performing
crews during monitoring or routine situations, but that information collection and shared mental model devel-
opment activities, and intracrew processes used during model development, differ significantly between lower-
and higher-performing control crews during nonroutine situations.
Key words : group dynamics; teams; shared cognition; mental models; nuclear power
History : Accepted by Linda Argote, organization performance, design, and strategy; received March 1, 2001.
This paper was with the authors 16 months for 2 revisions.
Introduction
In many high-reliability organizations, overall sys-
tems operations are the responsibility of a small crew
that controls multiple systems and makes decisions
concerning system functioning. These control crews
are teams of highly trained individuals who work
and train together to monitor system interfaces and
keep systems at equilibrium (Waller and Jehn 2000).
Control crews are particularly prevalent in aviation,
naval operations, petroleum and chemical refining,
nuclear power, and other environments in which reli-
abilityofperformanceiscrucial.Thesecrewsareoften
referred to as the “brains” of the complex systems
they manage, because control crews are responsi-
ble for interpreting information from multiple sys-
temsandmakingaccuratedecisionsduringabnormal,
time-pressured, high-workload situations.
Existing literature concerning control crews and
their organizations suggests two central themes
regarding control crew performance. First, because
control crews’ actions during abnormal situations
are so critical in high-reliability contexts, much of
the research on control crews and the training they
receive focuses on their actions during abnormal,
high-workload situations (see Waller 1999, Weick
1993), and includes the actions taken by crews
and organizations to manage and learn from crises
(Roberts 1993, Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Work in this
area focuses on the idea that successful crews must
“think on their feet and do the ‘right thing’ in novel
situations” (Weick and Roberts 1993, p. 358).
Second, while crew behaviors during nonroutine
situations are clearly critical to crew and organiza-
tion performance, other work in this area suggests
thatwhatcrewsdoduringlower-workloadlevelssig-
nificantly impacts their overall performance. Specifi-
cally, this work suggests that higher-performing con-
trolcrewsprepareforpossibleabnormalsituationsby
planning for such situations during lower-workload
periods(HueyandWickens1993,Orasanu1993,Pepi-
tone et al. 1988, Stout et al. 1999).
Thesetwocentralthemesaboutcontrolcrewactions
motivate our research regarding the timing and con-
tent of control crew actions. Taken together, these
themessuggestthatthepatternofcrewbehaviorsover
time and across variable workload conditions might
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