laws and administrative directives to be consistent with international law, unless their intention to do otherwise is conspicuously obvious. Viewed from the perspective of the US Constitution, it is accurate to say that both the president of the United States, in the normal range of administrative discretion, and the Congress, acting through federal legislation, have the power to direct the US government to violate interna- tional law, if they so choose. As Michael Paulsen (2009) points out, the US president likely has the authority under the US Constitution to direct the US government to act contrary to a treaty whenever he is acting within the range of his administrative discretion. It is unwise, however, for any of the three branches to undertake such a policy lightly, as violations of the law may create new international liabilities. Viewed from the perspective of the international legal system, contrary provisions in the domestic law of a nation, even if they appear in that nation’s constitution, are never a legal justification for breaking international law. Legally, other foreign states may be entitled to compensation and/or to be released from their own obligations to the United States if the United States violates its legal obligations. The United States accomplishes a great many of its present-day foreign policy objectives by holding other states to their international legal commitments. By com- plying with international law, even when it is inconven- ient or costly in the short run, the United States can reaffirm the importance and stability of international law. International law also permits the United States to attain a number of its policy objectives on a routine basis at relatively low cost. Strengthening international law gen- erally stabilizes nation’s expectations about their shared future and permits cooperative arrangements that are potentially advantageous to all nations over time. SEE ALSO Foreign Policy; International Organizations; International Tribunals. BIBLIOGRAPHY Brierly, J. L. The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace. 6th ed. Edited by Humphrey Waldock. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1994. Joyner, Christopher C. International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Koh, Harold Hongju. ‘‘Is International Law Really State Law?’’ Harvard Law Review 111 (1998): 1824–61. Osakwe, Chris. The Participation of the Soviet Union in Universal International Organizations. Leiden, Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972. Paulsen, Michael Stokes. ‘‘The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law.’’ Yale Law Journal 118 (2009): 1762–842. Slomanson, William R. Fundamental Perspectives on International Law. 6th ed. Boston: Wadsworth, 2011. Von Glahn, Gerhard, and James Larry Taulbee. Law among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law. 10th ed. Boston: Pearson, 2013. Michael John Struett North Carolina State University INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS International organizations are political entities that are organized across international boundaries. Convention- ally, the term is used primarily to refer to intergovern- mental organizations (IGOs), which are organizations with sovereign states as members created by international treaties. States create IGOs to achieve some general or specific purpose by coordinating their individual political authorities. Some well-known IGOs include the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. International nongovern- mental organizations (INGOs) are nonprofit associations of citizens from three or more sovereign states that are created for some specific purpose, often to promote a principled value, such as respect for human rights or elimination of nuclear weapons, or to regulate an area of interest, such as international sports competitions or industry-specific best practices. Usually INGOs are also considered part of the family of international organiza- tions; well-known examples include Amnesty Interna- tional, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Chamber of Commerce. INGOs often lobby decision makers within IGOs, through either formal or informal mechanisms. By so doing, INGOs can be an important voice of pluralistic influence on IGOs. Also, in many cases, INGOs can use local and subject-matter expertise to partner with IGOs to carry out programmatic activities, particularly in the fields of development, health, and the environment. WHY DO STATES CREATE IGOS? Sovereign states create IGOs to pool their resources, achieve common objectives, solve coordination problems, and/or reduce collective-action problems. Although IGOs vary widely in terms of the particular authorities they possess and the degree of autonomy they can exer- cise, in many cases that autonomous power is substantial (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Why, then, do states deliberately empower IGOs to take decisions or actions that limit the states’ autonomy in the future? Without a doubt, states do so repeatedly. A study based on data sets International Organizations 94 AMERICAN GOVERNANCE COPYRIGHT 2016 Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210