Two Kinds of Reverse Inference in Cognitive Neuroscience Guillermo Del Pinal * and Marco J. Nathan † To appear in Leefman & Hildt (eds.) The Human Sciences after the Decade of the Brain, Elsevier Abstract This essay examines the prospects and limits of ‘reverse inferring’ cognitive processes from neural data, a technique commonly used in cognitive neuroscience for discriminat- ing between competing psychological hypotheses. Specifically, we distinguish between two main types of reverse inference. The first kind of inference moves from the lo- cations of neural activation to the underlying cognitive processes. We illustrate this strategy by presenting a well-known example involving mirror neurons and theories of low-level mind-reading, and discuss some general methodological problems. Next we present the second type of reverse inference by discussing an example from recog- nition memory research. These inferences, based on pattern-decoding techniques, do not presuppose strong assumptions about the functions of particular neural locations. Consequently, while they have been largely ignored in methodological critiques, they overcome important objections plaguing traditional methods. Keywords: Reverse inference; cognitive neuroscience; multivariate-pattern analysis; mirror neurons; mind-reading; simulation theory; theory-theory * Zentrum f¨ ur Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (ZAS), Sch¨ utzenstr. 18m D-10117 Berlin, Germany. Email: ged2102@columbia.edu † Department of Philosophy, University of Denver, 264 Sturm Hall, 2000 E. Asbury Avenue, Denver, CO, USA, 80208. Email: marco.nathan@du.edu 1