Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness ANDREW BAILEY The University of Guelph Guelph, ON N1G 2W1 CANADA In its recent history, the philosophy of mind has come to resemble an entry into the genre of Hammer horror or pulpy science fiction. These days it is unusual to encounter a major philosophical work on the mind that is not populated with bats, homunculi, swamp-creatures, cruelly imprisoned genius scientists, aliens, cyborgs, other-worldly twins, self- aware computer programs, Frankenstein-monster-like Blockheads, or zombies. The purpose of this paper is to review the role in the philosophy of mind of one of these fantastic thought-experiments  the zombie  and to reassess the implications of zombie arguments, which I will suggest have been widely misinterpreted. I shall argue that zombies, far from being the enemy of materialism, are its friend; and furthermore that zombies militate against the computational model of consciousness and in favour of more biologically-rooted conceptions, and hence that zom- bie-considerations support a more reductive kind of physicalism about consciousness than has been in vogue in recent years. I Philosophical Zombies Zombies  of the philosophical rather than the Haitian or Hollywood variety  are theoretically constructed creatures stipulated to be identi- cal in certain respects with ordinary human beings, but lacking in other respects. 1 Perhaps the most familiar member of the zombie family is that CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 481 Volume 36, Number 4, December 2006, pp. 481-510 1 Philosophical zombies were introduced in their modern form by Robert Kirk (1974a, 1974b; see also Campbells imitation man (1970)), though the kernel of the idea