E MPIRICAL E THICS Becoming a father/refusing fatherhood: an empirical bioethics approach to paternal responsibilities and rights Jonathan Ives* † , Heather Draper* , Helen Pattison ‡ and Clare Williams § *Centre for the Study of Global Ethics, Department of Philosophy, The University of Birmingham, Birmingham; † Centre for Human Reproductive Science (ChRS), Birmingham Women’s NHS Foundation Trust, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TG; ‡ School of Life and Health Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham; § School of Social Science & Public Policy, King’s College London, UK E-mail: j.c.ives@bham.ac.uk Abstract In this paper, we present the first stage of an empirical bioethics project exploring the moral sources of paternal responsibilities and rights. In doing so, we present both (1) data on men’s normative constructions of fatherhood and (2) the first of a two-stage methodological approach to empirical bioethics. Using data gathered from 12 focus groups run with UK men who have had a variety of different fathering experiences (n ¼ 50), we examine men’s perspectives on how paternal responsibilities and rights are generated and the significance of the genetic connection within the father–child relationship. We do not attempt to explore men’s experiences of fatherhood or their fathering practices; and neither is the analysis driven from a particular sociological perspective. Rather, we explore men’s normative constructions of fatherhood in order to present accessible data that might be of significance to the philosophical/moral debate on the sources of paternal rights and responsibilities. Introduction In recent years, there has been a surge of academic interest in fathers and fatherhood from a number of disciplinary fields. Alongside a sizeable body of literature in areas such as the impact of father involvement/absence on child develop- ment, 1 the changing culture of fatherhood, 2–5 changing UK legal attitudes towards fatherhood, expressed in debate concerning the legal status of fathers and the law and ethics surrounding child support, 6–11 and changing notions of family and kinship, 12 – 14 there is also a smaller, but growing, body of literature that asks somewhat more philosophical questions, such as ‘what does fatherhood mean?’ and ‘on what are paternal rights and responsibilities (PRR) based?’ These questions have been approached in a variety of different ways, and have resulted, very broadly speaking, in the development of two distinct kinds of research endeavour – one empirical and one philosophical. Some philosophers have become interested in exploring the moral basis of PRR. There is, within that literature, a broad chasm a between those who wish to defend a biological (or genetic) conception of PRR, based on notions of genetic Jonathan Ives is a Research Fellow in the Centre for the Study of Global Ethics at the University of Birmingham. He completed his doctoral thesis on paternal rights and responsibilities in 2007, and is currently working on another empirical bioethics project examining the attitudes of health- care workers towards working during an influenza pandemic. His other research interests include the ethics of medical education, and the concept of value in, and at the end of, life. Heather Draper is a Reader in Biomedical Ethics in the Centre for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Birmingham, although she is currently on a secondment to the Centre for the Study of Global Ethics. Her primary research interests lie in the ethics of reproduction, particularly what a parent is and how parental responsibilities are acquired and discharged. Other research interests include bio-emergencies and clinical and research ethics. Helen Pattison is a Reader in Health Psychology, and Associate Director of Research, in the School of Life and Health Sciences at Aston University. Her primary research interests are: parental health behaviour; reproductive health, particularly psychology of pregnancy; the use of self- testing/monitoring; and other innovative health technologies. This work is informed by theoretical models of risk perception and communication. Her latest book, Sanctioning Pregnancy, was published by Routledge in 2007. Clare Williams is Professor of Social Science of Biomedicine and Director of the Centre for Biomedicine and Society at King’s College London. Her current research focuses on the clinical, ethical and social implications of innovative health technologies, particularly from the perspective of health-care practitioners and scientists; and on the influences of gender on health. a The ‘broad chasm’ we refer to here is intended to illustrate the difference between theories of PRR that require the presence of a genetic connection and those that do not. Arguably, this topology is imperfect, as it can be argued quite plausibly that many accounts that appear to be ‘genetic’ are in fact based upon morally significant causation, where the provision of genetic material is the morally significant cause, thus blurring the distinction between ‘genetic’ and ‘morally significant cause’ accounts. Both Callahan 15 and Nelson 18 appear to offer such a ‘genetic-causal’ account, while Engelhardt 16 and Hall 17 offer different versions of a ‘genetic proprietary’ account. What we refer to as ‘social’ accounts include other kinds of causation that do not require a genetic connection, such as intention or child welfare. For a good philosophical discussion of many of the prevalent theories of parental responsibility, see Weinberg’s recent paper ‘The moral complexity of sperm donation’. 19 DOI: 10.1258/ce.2008.008008 Clinical Ethics 2008; 3: 75–84