On Ambivalence and Risk: Reflexive Modernity and the New Human Genetics Anne Kerr and Sarah Cunningham-Burley Science Studies Unit Medical School University of University of Edinburgh Edinburgh abstract This critical examination of theories of reflexive modernity with respect to the new human genetics draws on a range of empirical studies and conceptual critiques. In it we explore the ways in which genetic knowledge and testing technologies offer new choices, construct new risks and generate public and professional ambivalence.We contrast this with the processes of ordering, reduction and control suffusing these developments.We argue that reductionism and determinism continue to infuse genetic theories and methods, that scientific and social progress are collapsed anew, and that certitude and surveillance remain powerful guiding principles.Within this context, the reflexive potential of individual choice, personal responsibility and risk estimation is seriously undermined. Indeed, in the case of the new human genetics, it seems that reflexive modernisation promotes, rather than curtails, a new modern/counter-modern eugenics. This occurs through the privatisation of lay ambivalence and professionals’ successful institutional reflexivity. The paper concludes with a consideration of the implications of our reflections for sociology and participatory democracy more broadly. keywords ambivalence, human genetics, reflexive modernity, risk Risk and ambivalence are key concepts in the sociologies of reflexive modernity (Beck 1992a and b, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; Bauman 1991, 1997; Giddens 1990, 1991, 1994). 1 It is argued that tensions inherent in global market capitalism, particularly risks associated with industrial development, have resulted in the breakdown of administrative, professional and expert categories and authority, an increasing lay scepticism and a new grassroots political activism. Ironically, it is technological development, not its failure, which is said to have spawned the radical processes of self-confrontation at the heart of reflexive modernity (Beck 1997). The plethora of lifestyle choices offered by modern science and technology is said to open up ‘new ethical spaces’ (Giddens 1994:190) by fermenting doubts about the natural order and scientific progress (Beck 1997). This can propel sociologists into critical but constructive discussions with the representatives of modern institutions (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994) through the rejection of what Beck calls a ‘sociology so specialised in the status quo that it becomes the status quo’ (Beck 1997:18). Taking up this challenge, we critically examine theories of reflexive modernity, with respect to Sociology Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 283–304. Printed in the United Kingdom © 2000 BSA Publications Limited 283