Lions and Tigers in Paradise: Terrorism and Insurgency and the State’s Response in Sri Lanka Ahmed S. HASHIM Professor of Strategic Studies, Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island Defence Against Terrorism Review Vol.3, No. 1, Spring 2010, pp. 1-24 Copyright © COE-DAT ISSN: 1307-9190 Introduction A year and a half ago, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLKAF) decisively defeated one of the most formidable, innovative and ruthless terrorist/insurgent organizations of contemporary times, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which purported to speak in the name of the Tamil ethnic community of Sri Lanka. How the Sri Lankan government managed to defeat this organization after three decades of protracted and seemingly endless conlict is a remarkable story, particularly since for almost 20 years the government had had little success whatsoever. Many countries which have been faced with the blight of terrorism and internal war have shown a great interest in studying the lessons of the Sri Lankan victory. In this context, the lessons of Sri Lanka are instructive for many countries faced with the problem of terrorism and insurgency. Of course, there is no one Abstract: The lessons of Sri Lanka are instructive for many countries faced with the problem of terrorism and insurgency. This article will explore the origins of the conlict, then the evolution of the protracted internal war between 1983 and 2009; the focus will be on how Sri Lanka evolved the strategy for victory – a victory that ended in the virtual elimination of the LTTE as a ighting organization and the decapitation of almost all its entire senior leadership. First, it will briely address the historical and political background of the conlict. Second, looks into the form of warfare and asks what the weapons of this conlict were? Third, explores what the factors that allowed the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to turn the tide and win a dramatic victory in May 2009 are. Keyword: Terrorism, Insurgency, State Responce Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers.