Implicit Virtue Susan A. Stark Bates College Many hold that we can be morally assessed only for actions and psychological states that are under our control. Recently, however, some researchers have noted that some actions appear to be influenced in part by psychological states that are not explicit, but instead are implicit, unconscious states. These states, known as implicit associations, are states of which we are unaware and over which we do not exercise any direct control, although these states nonetheless seem to influence actions. But if actions are influenced by implicit associations that are not under our control, how can we rightly be said to exert control over these actions, enabling us to morally assess them? Individuals do not choose these associations, they are not aware of them, and so it would seem that they are not under their control. Many would conclude that individuals cannot be morally assessed for actions that are influenced by implicit associations. I argue, by contrast, that it is possible for individuals to hold themselves accountable for implicit associations. One moral tradition, virtue theory, holds that individuals can be morally assessed for states that are not fully under their control. Aristotle and some virtue theorists argue that individuals can be morally assessed for their emotions, states that are not under their immediate control. I argue that this argument can serve as a model for implicit associations; as a result, I argue that individuals can be morally assessed for actions that are influenced by implicit associations. Keywords: Implicit Association Test, implicit associations, moral theory, moral psychology, virtue theory Philosophers have long held that we can be morally assessed only for actions and psycho- logical states that are under our control. Nagel (1979) explains this view nicely: “Prior to re- flection, it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control” (p. 24). According to Nagel, if we learn that an action or an emotion or some other psychological state is not under a person’s con- trol, we believe that the person is not, in that regard, an object of moral assessment. It is this assumption that underlies our differential treat- ment of kleptomaniacs and the criminally in- sane on the one hand and ordinary thieves and the criminally sane on the other. Accepting this requirement of control has led some philosophers (Immanuel Kant, for in- stance) to hold that actions themselves cannot be subject to moral assessment (Kant, 1933/ 1981). According to Kant, too many features of actions lie beyond an agent’s control. As a result, Kant restricted moral assessment to the psychological states that prompt actions (Kant called these states maxims). Maxims, according to Kant, are explicitly held, consciously chosen psychological states. Because Kant regarded maxims as explicit and because individuals are aware of their maxims and consciously choose them, we can, Kant thought, be subject to moral assessment for our maxims: They meet the con- dition of control that Nagel subsequently artic- ulated (Kant, AK 400). But we are now begin- ning to see that the philosophical problem of moral responsibility and the condition of con- trol is not so easily solved. Actions might some- times be prompted by explicit psychological states, but some psychologists are finding evi- This article was published Online First September 23, 2013. I am indebted to Lauren Ashwell, Frank Chessa, Sarah Conly, David Cummiskey, Michael Sargent, Paul Stark, and Charlotte Witt for wise and helpful comments on drafts of this article. I am grateful for their insight, which has done much to make this article better. Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- dressed to Susan A. Stark, Department of Philosophy, Hedge Hall, Bates College, 2 Andrews Road, Lewiston, ME 04240. E-mail: sstark@bates.edu This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology © 2013 American Psychological Association 2014, Vol. 34, No. 2, 146 –158 1068-8471/14/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0033601 146