Commentary on Newell and Shanks: "Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review" for Behavioral and Brain Sciences Citation: McLaren, I.P.L., Dunn, B.D., Lawrence, N.S., Milton, F.N., Verbruggen, F., Stevens, T., McAndrew, A., Yeates, F. (2014). Why decision making may not require awareness. Commentary on “Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review”, by B.R. Newell & D.R. Shanks. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 35-36. Why decision making may not require awareness I.P.L. McLaren(i.p.l.mclaren@exeter.ac.uk), B.D. Dunn(B.D.Dunn@exeter.ac.uk), N.S. Lawrence(Natalia.Lawrence@exeter.ac.uk), F.N. Milton(f.n.milton@ex.ac.uk), F. Verbruggen(F.L.J.Verbruggen@exeter.ac.uk), T. Stevens(t.stevens@ex.ac.uk), A. McAndrew(am375@exeter.ac.uk) and F. Yeates(fy212@exeter.ac.uk). Washington Singer Laboratories, School of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QG Abstract Newell and Shanks argue against the idea that any significant role for unconscious influences on decision making has been established by research to date. Inasmuch as this conclusion applies to the idea of an "intelligent cognitive unconscious" we would agree. Our concern is that the article could lead the unwary to conclude that there are no unconscious influences on decision making – and never could be. We give reasons why this may not be the case. We begin by raising some general methodological issues regarding the assessment of insight, and then move to considering other examples from our own work that also bear on the thesis of the article. The first methodological issue that we wish to raise regards the possible knock on effects of measuring insight in the stringent way that the authors recommend. Whilst we agree that the immediacy criterion is well- motivated in principle, the concurrent measurement of awareness with performance could predispose participants to use a conscious decision strategy in a situation where they may otherwise use an unconscious strategy. Indeed, this criterion seems fundamentally at odds with Newell & Shanks’s recommendation that highly reflective situations should be avoided in the study of unconscious decision making. The authors argue that on-line judgments do not alter judgment strategies by citing a study which showed that the inclusion of an on-line awareness measure made no difference to performance (Lagnado et al., 2006) but in reaching this conclusion they are relying on a null result (an approach that they criticise when it provides evidence in support of unconscious processes). Furthermore, the absence of performance differences does not rule out the possibility that different processing strategies are being used to obtain a similar level of performance in the two versions of the task. The second methodological issue pertains to the narrative rather than the systematic review approach that appears to have been adopted in the article. We agree with the authors that a focus on particular influential domains in such a review is entirely appropriate, but felt that a systematic search strategy for identifying studies in each domain should have been articulated. For example, work we have conducted has