1 QUINEAN SKEPTICISM ABOUT DE RE MODALITY AFTER DAVID LEWIS John Divers I. INTRODUCTION The classic articulation of Quine’s skepticism about de re modalizing is his (1953b) argument against the semantic and metaphysical coherence of de re modal predication (II). Lewis’s theory of de re modality (III) allows us to construct a response to Quine that shows up a crucial flaw in that argument (IV). Moreover, the counterpart theory of de re modality that underpins Lewis’s response is a theory that an exacting Quinean should find ideologically congenial (V). So what scope remains for a neo-Quinean, but post- counterpart-theoretic, skepticism about de re modalizing? I consider, but resist, the natural thought that such skepticism ought to focus on the apparent ontological commitments of counterpart theory (VI). Rather, I suggest, the natural and proper focus for a skepticism about de re modalizing is the continuing absence of any substantial account of the utility or function of such judgement (VII). I do not doubt that it is permissible to read Quine in ways other than the way in which I read him and, certainly, with different emphases. I do not doubt that there are many other responses to Quine’s argument that merit just as much attention as the Lewisian response even though I do not discuss them here 1 . I do not doubt, either, that some philosophers will have no sympathy at all with the way that issues of de re modality are handled by Quine or by Lewis. However, I think that there is much to be learned by allowing that