187 THE CONCEPTUAL CONTOURS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM LOUIS J. KOTZÉ ∗ I. INTRODUCTION With respect to its theory and conceptual architecture, “environmental constitutionalism” has received scant attention to date. Commentators are only just starting to direct their analytical and descriptive focus to this evolving concept. Generally speaking, environmental constitutionalism is associated mostly with debates surrounding the protection of environmental rights and the way constitutions the world over employ a rights-based approach to augment environmental care. 1 Yet, environmental constitutionalism is a broader concept that stretches beyond but includes and is often based on the rights-based approach. As a socio-legal and political project that seeks to transform environmental governance to the extent that it provides improved environmental protection, environmental constitutionalism additionally employs a wide range of other constructs and features typical of the broader constitutional paradigm and the environmental governance movement. These include, among others, the rule of law, the separation of powers, the principle of legality, aspirational fundamental values such as human dignity and equality, and various principles derived from soft law such as sustainable development. The time is arguably ripe to commence more deliberately with an enquiry into the conceptual contours of environmental constitutionalism from a normative point of view. While it would be impossible to propose any convincing and systemized normative analysis of environmental constitutionalism in a succinct way that respects the space limitations of this special issue of the Widener Law Review, I do hope to take some tentative steps towards such a normative enquiry that could hopefully be expanded in the future. In doing so, and as a point of departure, the paper commences in Part II with an analysis of existing views on environmental constitutionalism, including a brief search for the rationale behind this concept. Part III elaborates on, what I believe, is the conceptual fulcrum around which environmental constitutionalism revolves, namely the concepts of constitutions and constitutionalism. Based on the foregoing analysis, Part IV proposes a consolidated description of “environmental constitutionalism.” * Professor of Law, North-West University, South Africa; Visiting Professor of Environmental Law, University of Lincoln, United Kingdom; and Deputy-director of the Global Network for the Study of Human Rights and the Environment (GNHRE.org). The financial assistance of the South African National Research Foundation (NRF) is greatly acknowledged. My sincere thanks to Francois Venter (North-West University) for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. All views and errors remain my own. 1 See, e.g., DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 117-18 (2012); see generally JAMES R. MAY & ERIN DALY, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2015).