The Interval Shapley Value: An Axiomatization S.Z. Alparslan G¨ok ∗ R. Branzei † S. Tijs ‡§ Abstract The Shapley value, one of the most widespread concepts in Oper- ations Research applications of cooperative game theory, was defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. Recently much research work has been done in order to extend OR models and methods, in particular cooperative game theory, for situ- ations with interval data. This paper focuses on the Shapley value for cooperative games where the set of players is finite and the coalition values are compact intervals of real numbers. The interval Shapley value is characterized with the aid of the properties of additivity, effi- ciency, symmetry and dummy player, which are straightforward gener- alizations of the corresponding properties in the classical cooperative game theory. Keywords : cooperative games, interval data, the Shapley value, Operations Research JEL Classification: C 71 * S¨ uleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of Mathemat- ics, 32 260 Isparta, Turkey and Institute of Applied Mathematics, Middle East Technical University, 06531 Ankara, Turkey, e-mail: alzeynep@metu.edu.tr † Faculty of Computer Science, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Ia¸ si, Romania, e- mail: branzeir@info.uaic.ro ‡ CentER and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, The Nether- lands, e-mail: S.H.Tijs@uvt.nl § The authors gratefully thank two anonymous referees whose detailed remarks and suggestions improved the presentation substantially, and acknowledge the support of TUBITAK (Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Council). 1