1 Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction Tim Bayne University of Oxford and St. Catherine's College Manor Road Oxford OX1 3UJ United Kingdom tim.bayne@gmail.com and Michelle Montague University of Bristol Department of Philosophy 9 Woodland Road Bristol BS8 1TB United Kingdom Forthoming in Bayne and Montague (eds.) Cognitive Phenomenology (OUP, 2011). This version of the paper is only a draft. For purposes of quotation please consult the published version. 1. Introduction Consciousness takes many forms. There are experiences in the five familiar sensory modalities: vision, audition, olfaction, gustation, and touch. There are bodily sensations of various kinds: itches, tingles, cramps, pains, and experiences of hunger, thirst and drowsiness. There are the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation, despair, boredom, fear, and anxiety. Each of these kinds of conscious state has a distinctive phenomenal character; there is ‘something it is like’ to be in such states. Although no one would pretend that we have a fully adequate conception of these forms of consciousness, it seems fair to say that we have a respectable grip on how they ought to be characterized. We know—at least in rough and ready terms—what it is that a theory of perceptual and sensory consciousness must account for. But our conscious lives are not limited to perception, bodily sensation, and affect. With the possible exception of moments in which one is immersed in physical exercise, musical