It runs in the family: Meta-regulation and its siblings Sharon Gilad The Department of Political Science and the Federman School of Public Policy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Abstract Regulators in different countries and domains experiment with regulatory tools that allow organi- zations to adapt regulation to their individual circumstances, while holding them accountable for their self-regulation systems. Several labels have been coined for this type of regulation, including systems-based regulation, enforced self-regulation, management-based regulation, principles-based regulation, and meta-regulation. In this article, these forms of regulatory governance are classified as belonging to one family of “process-oriented regulation.”Based on a review of diverse empirical and theoretical research, it is suggested that the family of process-oriented regulation tends to have a positive, albeit varied, impact on organizations’ performance, and the factors that shape this inconsistent effect are analyzed. Building on aspects of Parker’s normative construct of “meta- regulation,” the article explores the extent to which her innovative notion of a learning-oriented approach to regulation might overcome some of the weaknesses of prevalent process-oriented approaches. It is proposed that under conditions of regulatory uncertainty or entrenched and prevalent non-compliance or both, meta-regulation is likely to have many advantages over other forms of process-oriented regulation. Yet realizing these advantages requires a rare combination of high regulatory capacity, a stable regulatory agenda, and a supportive political environment. Keywords: enforced self-regulation, management-based regulation, meta-regulation, principles-based regulation, process-oriented regulation, regulatory governance, self-regulation. 1. Introduction Regulators frequently need to cope with heterogeneous and fast-moving industries, which do not lend themselves to prescriptive regulation. Moreover, even homogeneous and stable industries can be impervious to regulatory prescription because of widespread business resistance and a lack of commitment to or capacity for compliance. In response, regulators in different countries and domains are experimenting with regulatory arrange- ments that allow regulated organizations flexibility to tailor regulation to their individual circumstances, while holding them accountable for the adequacy and efficacy of their internal control systems. Similar trends have been observed in state regulation of health and safety (e.g. Gunningham 1999, 2007; Hutter 2001; Gunningham & Sinclair 2009), food safety (e.g. Coglianese & Lazer 2003; Fairman & Yapp 2005), financial markets Correspondence: Sharon Gilad, The Department of Political Science and the Federman School of Public Policy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. Email: gilads@mscc.huji.ac.il Accepted for publication 19 September 2010. Regulation & Governance (2010) 4, 485–506 doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2010.01090.x © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd