Regulation with non-price discrimination Jan Y. Sand ∗ University of Tromso, Department of Economics, N-9037 Tromso, Norway Abstract This paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges, and the effect such regulation has on incentives for non-price discrimination. I show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against rivals by means of non-price measures, optimal access charges must be set higher than in the case when no discrimination is possible since the level of the access charge affects incentives to practice foreclosure. Furthermore, I show that whether the access charge should be used to level or tilt the playing field in favour of the more efficient firm, depends on the cost associated with non-price discrimination. JEL Classifications: D82, L13, L22, L51 Keywords: regulation, vertical relations, duopoly, non-price discrimination 1 Introduction In vertically related markets, the production of final products makes use of (essen- tial) inputs produced in complementary markets. The producers of these essential inputs usually have opportunities to earn positive economic profits. The extent to ∗ E-mail address: Jan.Sand@nfh.uit.no 1