NO LUCK IN THE DISTANCE: A REPLY TO FREITAG Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (published in Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy) Abstract In a recent article in this journal, Wolfgang Freitag argues that Gettier- style cases that are based on the notion of “distant” epistemic luck cannot be ruled out as cases of knowledge by modal conditions such as safety or sensitivity. I argue that (1) safety and sensitivity can be easily fixed and that (2) Freitag provides no convincing reason for the existence of “distant” epistemic luck. In a recent article in this journal, Wolfgang Freitag argues that Gettier- style cases that are based on the notion of distant epistemic luck, i.e., “luck which discloses itself in distant possible worlds alone” (Freitag 2014, p. 45), cannot be ruled out as cases of knowledge by modal conditions such as S AFETY (if S knows that p, then S believes that p truly in the actual world, and in nearly all, if not all, close possible worlds in which the conditions for belief formation are the same as in the actual world, S only believes that p when p is true) 1 1 Adapted from Pritchard (2005, p. 163). See Broncano-Berrocal (2014) for a defense of the safety principle against counterexamples to its necessity for knowledge. 1