1 Piotr Makowski Consequences of Concretism: Rationality and Reasons for Action (chapter three of my book: Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s Action Theory – Reinterpretive Studies, forthcoming in Palgrave Macmillan) draft: 17.03.16 please, do not quote! comments welcome makowski@amu.edu.pl 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Kotarbiński on Rationality 3.2.1. Methodological and Substantial Rationality 3.2.2. Context: Herbert Simon’s Procedural Rationality 3.2.3. Rationality and Concretism 3.3. Rationality and Reasons 3.3.1. Rationality and Responding to Reasons 3.3.2. Explanatory Reasons 3.3.3. Normative Reasons Pro Toto and Pro Tanto 3.4. Concretism and Reasons 3.4.1. Reasons as States of Affairs 3.4.2. Reasons as (True) Beliefs 3.4.3. Evidentialism about Reasons? Conclusion 3.1. Introduction Rationality is perhaps the most often discussed topic in philosophy. Also, if we consider it from the angle of the history of philosophy and from the angle of its ontological and normative consequences for the picture of ourselves as agents, it is perhaps the most central topic in the philosophy of action. The previous chapter satisfies to understand why this is so. Rationality is related to intentional goal striving and effectiveness. The so-called instrumental rationality is responsible for technical or procedural aspects of human effectiveness. And, in itself, it is a result of some more basic assumptions