Cyprus 1974: Turkey's Military Success Followed by Political Stalemate Tozun Bahcheli When Turkey's prime minister Bulent Ecevit ordered the Turkish military to Cyprus on 20 July 1974 in response to the Greek junta's coup five days earlier, he hoped to accomplish two vital objectives: to stop the junta and its Greek-Cypriot allies from bringing about the island's union with Greece (eno- sis) and to reverse the Greek-Cypriot and Greek gains made at the expense of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots during the previous decade. He achieved both. Turkey's action laid to rest the dream of enosis that was embraced for many years by large segments of the Greek and Greek-Cypriot publics and their leaders. Moreover, the military's partition of Cyprus, which left Turkish Cypriots in control of 37 percent of the island, greatly enhanced the capacity of Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots to safeguard their respective interests. And yet, after fifty years of jockeying and negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots under United Nations auspices, no political settlement has emerged on the island. Despite the fact that Ankara holds important cards in Cyprus on account of its military presence and its considerable influence over the Turkish Cypriot community,^ the efforts of the Greek-Cypriot- controlled Republic of Cyprus and Greece in internationalizing the Cyprus issue have repeatedly put Turkish diplomats on the defensive. Much to the 1. There are an estimated thirty thousand to forty thousand Turkish troops stationed in Northern Cyprus. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Cyprus—3rd Quarter 2013, store.eiu.com /product.aspx?pubid=420000842&pid=50000205&gid=420000842. Tozun Baheheli is professor of political science at King's University College at Western University, London, Ontario, Canada. He wishes to thank Sid Noel, Bulent Aliriza and Erin Hannah for their insight and comments on an earlier draft. Mediterranean Quarterly 25:1 DOI 10.1215/10474552-2420260 Copyright 2014 by Mediterranean Affairs, Inc.