50 | THE ISLAMIC MONTHLY THE  ISSUE | 51 Analysts today are skeptical about the possibility that Pakistani political par- ties – which have done little to promote a democratic culture internally, have pursued power with little regard for the public good and whose leaders are unable to communi- cate with each other without an “interna- tional broker” – can provide an alternative to the military. And yet, despite such political uncertainty, the restoration of party-based representative government is a positive de- velopment as it aids nation-building and helps facilitate agreement on issues of na- tional signiicance. After the 2008 elections, for example, the leadership of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Awami National Party (ANP) have conducted poli- tics by consultation and consensus building, which has created an expectation that they will be able to sustain a coalition government and stable government-opposition relations. Yet this fragile consensus could rupture if the “international brokers” (mainly the United States) withdraw support, change direction or lose interest in “managing” Pakistan’s in- ternal politics. he PPP-led coalition government is in its third year of rule, but corruption, violence and sectarian strife continue to deepen the crisis of governance. Despite signiicant po- litical achievements – including the passage of the 18th Amendment, the seventh Na- tional Finance Commission Award (which governs the distribution of resources between the four provinces) and a Balochistan pack- age (economic and other measures to address provincial sentiment after former President Pervez Musharraf’s use of force there) – the political government’s public stock has been low on account of its weak governance and inability to solve the deepening energy crisis, rising inlation and joblessness. All this has eroded public conidence in party govern- ment and democracy. Furthermore, its poor and insensitive handling of the worst loods in Pakistan’s history could turn out to be a watershed for the resurgence of the military and even the demise of party rule. Two contradictory trends are evident in Pakistan’s post February 2008 election era. he irst is political continuity – the third and fourth generations of the traditional feudal, tribal, religious and business families are entering the political arena. Middle class representation in elite structures remains marginal. Political parties remain person- ality-centric and are in decay: they are or- ganizationally weak, lack vision and a clear program, and have no leadership succession plan. he ruling coalition led by the Peoples Party has banded together not on the basis of any principle but of expediency and a desire for power. Second, the social class origins of the dominant institutions, namely the military, is undergoing transformation – the recruit- ment pattern is shifting from the upper- middle class to the lower-middle class. he emerging military elites are increasingly from an urban background and not rural. his means that the social composition of Pakistani elites is undergoing change. he emerging elite has humbler origins, hold conservative social and political views and relect authoritarian tendencies rather than democratic values. Some elite circulation ap- pears to be taking place but the implications for strengthening democracy and a party system remain uncertain. Given these changing dynamics, the crit- ical question is how is the military adopting to a party-led government? here are sev- eral indications that, despite serious crises, civil-military relations are undergoing an important transformation. his is borne out by several developments. In July 2010, Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani ended rising speculation about Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of army staf, by granting him a three-year extension. his suggests an im- proved level of trust between the civil and military leadership that is helping to deine the parameters of their evolving relationship. In theory and constitutionally, this estab- lishes the norm of the supremacy of civilian leadership. However, once the chief of army staf is selected, he assumes the role of an arbiter, sometimes broker, and of course, a potential intervener in the country’s political process. What role the chief of army staf chooses to play depends on three factors: his personal orientation, political circumstances and the corporate interests of the military. Seen from this perspective, Kayani has been careful and discrete, revealing little about his political or ideological beliefs IN DEPTH: PAKISTAN’S TURMOIL IN DEPTH: PAKISTAN’S TURMOIL except on national security issues. He went public in stating that the Pakistani military is “India centric” in its orientation and ap- proach. Nationally and internationally, he is recognized as a “professional soldier.” In 2009, Time magazine declared Kayani the “most inluential general in the world.” Of- icials who have worked with Kayani convey that he is calm, calculating and prudent, and keeps his cards close to his chest. While Kayani is trying to extricate the military from politics, a small number of vocal retired generals want to see greater involvement of the military in the governing of the country. On the subject of Kayani’s three-year exten- sion, political parties showed considerable restraint and in a muted way welcomed the decision, whereas some retired generals were vociferous in arguing that Kayani should not have accepted the extension. By and large, the decision has been welcomed and seen as the right of an elected government to make. THE CHANGING CHARACTER AND COMPOSITION OF MILITARY ELITES During the 1970s, particularly since 1979, the social origins of the military elite have undergone signiicant changes. Gens. Je- hangir Karamat and Pervez Musharraf and their cohorts were the last of the pre-Inde- pendence generation. he year 2007 marked the ascendancy of an indigenous post-In- dependence generation at the helm of mili- tary decision making. Until 1971, the base of military elites (brigadiers to general) was relatively small, around 120 oicers. Today, there has been a ive-fold increase to more than 600 oicers. During the 1960s and until the mid-70s, the generals from a rural background and the Potohar – the so called martial races – were dominant. But the new breed is more urban and comes from more modest social backgrounds. here is a noticeable shift from the “Huntingtonian model of military pro- fessionalism” to the “Janowitzian model” – moving beyond a soldierly profession and assuming constabulary functions. he irst noticeable trend is that the mili- tary’s role in Pakistani society has under- gone transformation – it has acquired a new sense of conidence, and is tentative and cau- tious in showing “deference” to the political by SAEED SHAFQAT PAKISTAN’S MILITARY: T C  S D  P ©joshua kruger / flickr