Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The ‘‘slippery slope’’ framework Erich Kirchler * , Erik Hoelzl, Ingrid Wahl Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Universitaetsstrasse 7, A-1010 Wien, Austria Received 14 September 2006; received in revised form 23 May 2007; accepted 29 May 2007 Available online 4 July 2007 Abstract A framework for tax compliance is suggested in which both the power of tax authorities and trust in the tax authorities are relevant dimensions for understanding enforced and voluntary compliance. Dynamic interactions between power and trust are considered. Using the framework as a conceptual tool, factors studied in previous research, such as fines, audit probabilities, tax rate, knowledge, atti- tudes, norms and fairness are reviewed and discussed with reference to the power and trust dimen- sions. Using the framework as an operational tool, approaches of responsive regulation to increase tax compliance are discussed. Ó 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: H26 PsycINFO classification: 4270; 2960 Keywords: Taxation; Compliance; Authority; Power; Trust; Social behavior 1. Introduction Paying taxes is a duty for citizens. The primary interest of the state is that citizens follow this duty and behave in compliance to the tax rules, regardless of the motives for 0167-4870/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2007.05.004 * Corresponding author. Tel.: +43 1 427747880; fax: +43 1 427747889. E-mail address: erich.kirchler@univie.ac.at (E. Kirchler). Available online at www.sciencedirect.com Journal of Economic Psychology 29 (2008) 210–225 www.elsevier.com/locate/joep