Journal of European Public Policy 10:1 February 2003: 1–19 The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency Jonas Tallberg ABSTRACT Existing literature is overwhelmingly sceptical about the capacity of the Council Presidency to shape the EU agenda. The Presidency’s ability to promote private concerns is considered highly limited and, typically, the Presidency is depicted as a ‘responsabilite ´ sans pouvior’. This article challenges the conventional wisdom on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, it develops a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda-shaping: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda exclusion. In this exercise, I draw on theories of bargaining and decision-making developed in international relations and American politics. Empirically, the article provides an inventory of the instruments available to the Presidency within each form of agenda-shaping, as well as illustrative cases that demonstrate how Presidencies regularly influence outcomes in EU policy-making. Illustrations are drawn primarily from the six consecutive Presidencies in the period 1999–2001: Germany, Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden and Belgium. KEY WORDS Agenda-setting; chair; Council; entrepreneurship; leadership; Presidency. INTRODUCTION Existing literature on the Council Presidency of the European Union (EU) pays scant attention to the agenda-shaping powers of this office, focusing instead on the Presidency as leader, mediator, external representative and administrative manager. To the extent that the literature addresses the Presi- dency’s influence over the EU’s policy agenda, the assessments are overwhelm- ingly pessimistic, depicting the Presidency as an office without power. In this article, I challenge this established wisdom on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, I develop a conceptual framework capable of capturing alternative forms of agenda influence. In this exercise, I draw on theories of bargaining, agenda-setting and decision-making, as developed in international relations and American politics. Empirically, I demonstrate that Presidencies regularly engage in alternative forms of agenda-shaping and influence outcomes Journal of European Public Policy ISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online © 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/1350176032000046903