Cultural Psychology, A New Look: Reply to Bond (2002), Fiske (2002), Kitayama (2002), and Miller (2002) Daphna Oyserman University of Michigan Markus Kemmelmeier University of Nevada Heather M. Coon North Central College M. H. Bond (2002), A. P. Fiske (2002), S. Kitayama (2002), and J. G. Miller (2002) joined D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) in highlighting limitations of the individualism– collectivism model of culture. Concern is warranted; nevertheless, individualism– collectivism helps structure dis- course on the influence of culture on the mind. To avoid level-of-analysis entanglements, Oyserman et al. propose an integrative model that includes distal, proximal, and situated cultural features of societies and internalized models of these features, highlights the importance of subjective construal, and uses evolutionary perspectives to clarify the basic problems cultures address. Framed this way, it is clear that, depending on situational requirements, both individualism- and collectivism-focused strategies are adaptive; thus, it is likely that human minds have adapted to think both ways. That societies, cultures, and nations differ in many subtle and not-so-subtle ways is well known. Moreover, some of these dif- ferences are historical rather than current and some of these differences are more central than others. Travelogues, comedy routines, and business guides built on differences in the under- standing of time, norms for politeness, and other elements of everyday life are perennial favorites. What is less clear, though, is the extent to which differences between nations, societies, cultures, and ethnic and other groups can be modeled and systematized to make predictions about how culture can systematically influence cognition, affect, and motivation. That is, Are some of the ways that, say, Americans and Chinese differ applicable to ways in which Americans and Indians differ or the ways in which Germans and Nigerians differ? Although it is of interest to understand a specific culture at a certain time and place, this is not the central goal of cultural psychology. Rather, the essential goal of the field is to understand how culture influences how the mind works and to identify cultural contingencies that moderate general processes of human cognition, affect, and behavior. To take on this challenge, cultural psychologists must posit general principles that are likely to have different instantiations across cultures and are likely to have impact on human cognition, affect, and behavior. In response to our (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002) review of the literature on individualism and collectivism, Bond (2002), Fiske (2002), Kitayama (2002), and Miller (2002) each highlight the limitations of the current body of empirical evidence. We agree with many of the points the commentaries raise and note that these concerns are shared by many well-known voices in the field (e.g., Kagitcibasi, 1997; Kashima, Yamaguchi, Kim, Choi, Gelfand, & Yuki, 1995; Triandis, 1995, 1996). First, we agree that individualism and collectivism do not replace the study of culture; specific, local phenomena should be studied and have a place within cultural psychology. Rich, detailed descriptions of particu- lar groups, societies, and situations can be invaluable at the hy- pothesis generation of any research program. Second, the terms individualism and collectivism have become somewhat bloated; they are too broadly construed and are often used to explain almost any cultural or cross-cultural difference. Third, it is not useful to tie individualism and collectivism too closely to particular, oppos- ing, articulated value systems. Finally, cultural psychologists should not abandon the search for other promising general or foundational cultural schemas. Nevertheless, we disagree with the gist of the commentators’ conclusions. Despite the simplifications and flaws in the current body of research, some relevant insights have been gained. Rather than abandon the individualism– collectivism constructs, we pro- pose that individualism and collectivism are helpful in describing particular ways in which cultures can differ systematically. The individualism– collectivism constructs are helpful general models of one active ingredient, or means by which culture influences not only what we think but also how we think. Individualism and collectivism can be helpful if thought of as general cultural meta- schemas or foundational schemas— generalized, abstracted ways of making meaning—rather than as a specific list of articulated values or a specific set of content-rich cultural scripts. Rich de- Daphna Oyserman, Institute for Social Research, University of Michi- gan; Markus Kemmelmeier, Department of Sociology, University of Ne- vada; Heather M. Coon, Department of Psychology, North Central College. This article benefited from discussion with Norbert Schwarz and the Culture and Self lab group at Stanford University. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Daphna Oyserman, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 426 Thompson Avenue, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106-1248. E-mail: daphna.oyserman@umich.edu Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 2002, Vol. 128, No. 1, 110 –117 0033-2909/02/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0033-2909.128.1.110 110