ESSAY REVIEW Revisiting Structure Vasso Kindi and Theodore Arabatzis (eds): Kuhn’s The structure of scientific revolutions revisited. New York and London: Routledge, 2012, ix+259pp, £80 HB Howard Sankey Published online: 6 July 2013 Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 The year 2012 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the original publication in 1962 of T. S. Kuhn’s masterwork, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Numerous events and publications were organized in recognition of that anniversary. Though primarily based on a conference held in Athens in 2008, the present volume forms part of an impressive surge in Kuhn-related activity that was timed to coincide with the anniversary. The volume opens with an introduction by the editors, Vasso Kindi and Theodore Arabatzis. This is followed by ten chapters, divided into three parts. I will follow the sequence of these chapters in my comments on the book. In revisiting Structure, Kindi and Arabatizis seek to ‘‘reassess, 50 years after its first publication, its value, impact and current relevance’’ (1). Their aim is not merely to reassess Structure, but to ‘‘take a fresh look at’’ the book in a way that reflects current scholarship rather than the ‘‘immediate concerns scholars had at the time of the book’s publication’’ (3). So, for example, various essays in the volume draw upon recent work in the history of the philosophy of science and cognitive psychology and reflect the current focus on scientific practice as well as a tendency toward naturalism. On the whole, the essays present a sympathetic reading of Structure that stands in marked contrast to some of the negative reaction occasioned by Kuhn’s work at earlier stages in the history of its reception. Structure opens with Kuhn’s remarkably prescient claim that history might bring about a ‘‘decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed’’ (SSR, 1). But it has not always been apparent what target Kuhn had in his sights. Was he aiming at the positivists, or, perhaps Popper? In his paper, Gurol Irzik considers this question in detail. He argues that ‘‘Kuhn’s critical forays are directed more to the textbook image of science than to logical positivism (or to Popperian falsificationism for that matter)’’ (16). Despite the fact that Kuhn is often H. Sankey (&) School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, Old Quad, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, Australia e-mail: chs@unimelb.edu.au 123 Metascience (2014) 23:43–47 DOI 10.1007/s11016-013-9821-3