1 The conflict between a static and a dynamic theory of time in its relation to von Wright’s work and to human freedom Mauro Dorato Department of Philosophy University of Rome 1 1. Time, change, causation and freedom Von Wright’s work has been characterized by an intense interest in the logic and the philosophy of time, dating back to his famous articles in the mid-sixties, ‘And Next’ (1965), ‘And Then’ (1966a) and ‘Always’ (1968), and to a paper that has been widely discussed in Italy, namely ‘Time, Change and Contradiction’ (1969), which seemed to suggest the possibility of a formalization of dialectic logic in a moment in which Marxism held a strong grip on many Italian intellectuals. I think it is safe to assume that von Wright’s interest in temporal logic was spurred both by his interest in modal logic — temporal and modal concepts have strong structural analogies and can be given a similar semantics — and by his concern for a theory of human action which could make room for a genuine notion of change and for our freedom (1980). In what follows, I will discuss the view according to which the notion of change needed for free actions presupposes the human capacity of shaping and influencing the future, a future which then must be regarded as ‘open’. ‘Open’ here does not refer to some form of indeterminism, but simply means ‘(ontologically) unreal with respect to the past’. Consequently, according to the view to be discussed — also known as the ‘dynamic theory of time’ — change is given by the becoming real in the present (alternatively, at time t) of previously unreal facts or events. In one (tenseless) version of this theory, change can occur if and only if, for any time t, events or tenselessly conceived facts occurring after t are unreal, while events or facts before t (or simultaneous with t) are real (Broad 1923, Tooley 1997). In another (tensed) version, it is the absolute property of presentness, objectively and mind- independently possessed by facts or events, which separates a real past from an unreal future (Smith 1993). Such an ever-changing, monadic attribute of ‘being present’ is allegedly possessed by all events successively, and the resulting ontological change is mirrored by the