349 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY, VOL. 39 NO. 3, DECEMBER 2009 Pecuniary Disincentives in the Anti-Doping Fight Wolfgang Maennig University of Hamburg, Department of Economics, Chair for Economic Policy Von-Melle-Park 5 D-20146 Hamburg (Email: w.maennig@econ.uni-hamburg.de) Most delinquent activities can generally be regarded as a choice made by an individual in the face of a number of legal and illegal alternatives for action, whereby the course of action chosen promises the greatest expected net utility for the individual at the time of the decision (Becker 1968). In the case of doping, the respective microeconomic calculation (Maennig 2002) makes it possible to simultaneously take into account a number of behavioural determinants such as additional sporting honours, additional income, moral qualms and short and long-term health risks. Theoretically in line with such microeconomic analysis, contributions from pedagogical and other disciplines often emphasise the role of ethical standards and moral suasion in fighting doping. In the last few decades economists have also put more weight on such ideas as it is “(good sporting) governance” which forms the climate within a sporting discipline and is certainly important in shaping the decision for or against doping. In this context, a survey of athletes undertaken by Dr. Bob Goldman from Chicago is worthy of mention. The respondents were asked whether they would take a drug which enabled them to remain unbeaten for five years (without punishment) but which had side effects that would subsequently cause them to die. Over half the respondents replied that they would take the drug (Bird and Wagner 1997, p. 751). It is possibly that such strong discounting of the(ir) future is immanent in the preferences and lives of top athletes. Moral suasion however, might reach its systematic limits here. Competition bans, which nowadays are a central part of anti-doping strategies, have shown limited success. In economic terms, bans do not sufficiently increase the expected costs of doping. For example, the bans have little deterrence effect on athletes who may be at the end of their careers. Hence it comes as no surprise that an above average number of older athletes have been involved in doping cases. (Increased) financial penalties 1 for athletes convicted of doping violations which could raise the expected costs of doping needs to be re-examined; the implementation of such fines 1 Chapter II, Article 3 of the Anti-Doping Code envisages fines of up to US $100,000, cf. International Olympic Committee (1999).