Research Report Hedonic and Instrumental Motives in Anger Regulation Maya Tamir, 1 Christopher Mitchell, 1 and James J. Gross 2 1 Boston College and 2 Stanford University ABSTRACT—What motivates individuals to regulate their emotions? One answer, which has been highlighted in emotion-regulation research, is that individuals are mo- tivated by short-term hedonic goals (e.g., the motivation to feel pleasure). Another answer, however, is that individu- als are motivated by instrumental goals (e.g., the moti- vation to perform certain behaviors). We suggest that both answers have merit. To demonstrate the role instrumental goals may play in emotion regulation, we pitted short-term hedonic motives and instrumental motives against each other, by testing whether individuals were motivated to experience a potentially useful, albeit unpleasant, emo- tion. We found that (a) individuals preferred activities that would increase their level of anger (but not their level of excitement) when they were anticipating confrontational, but not nonconfrontational, tasks and that (b) anger im- proved performance in a confrontational, but not a non- confrontational, task. These findings support a functional view of emotion regulation, and demonstrate that in cer- tain contexts, individuals may choose to experience emo- tions that are instrumental, despite short-term hedonic costs. One prominent feature of emotions is their hedonic tone: Some emotions are pleasant, others are unpleasant. Because indi- viduals prefer pleasure over pain (Freud, 1926/1959), they are generally motivated to increase pleasant and decrease un- pleasant emotions. Emotions, however, are more than feelings. They have instrumental aspects (Frijda, 1986). This suggests an- other motive for regulating emotions, namely, to increase useful and decrease harmful emotions. The investigation reported in this article tested whether in- strumental motives for regulating emotions can trump short-term hedonic motives. We pitted instrumental and hedonic motives against each other, asking whether individuals would choose to experience an unpleasant emotion (i.e., anger) when it was likely to be useful in an upcoming task. WHY DO INDIVIDUALS REGULATE THEIR EMOTIONS? Emotion regulation refers to individuals’ attempts to influence their emotions (Gross, 2002). It is generally assumed that in- dividuals seek to increase pleasant and decrease unpleasant emotions (Larsen, 2000). Self-regulation, however, is not driven exclusively by short-term hedonic considerations. Indeed, in- dividuals often forgo immediate pleasure to maximize long-term utility (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Such instrumental motives might play a role in the regulation of emotion (Parrott, 1993). Therefore, we endorse an instrumental approach to emo- tion regulation, according to which preferences for emotions depend on the balance of their hedonic and instrumental benefits in a given context (Tamir, 2005; Tamir, Chiu, & Gross, 2007). The hedonic and instrumental benefits of emotions are sepa- rable. Both pleasant and unpleasant emotions can be useful in specific contexts (e.g., Izard, 1990; Keltner & Gross, 1999). Individuals may be motivated to increase pleasant emotions for either their short-term hedonic or their instrumental benefits. However, individuals may be motivated to increase unpleasant emotions primarily for their instrumental benefits. Empirical support for the idea that emotion regulation can be motivated by instrumental considerations is currently scarce. Therefore, this investigation examined whether individuals can be motivated to increase their experience of potentially useful, yet unpleasant, emotions. Specifically, we tested whether indi- viduals would seek to increase their anger when they were ex- pecting to engage in a task in which anger might be helpful. HEDONIC AND INSTRUMENTAL ASPECTS OF ANGER Anger is an unpleasant emotion. It arises when individuals feel they are not attaining a goal because of another person’s im- proper action, yet feel capable of altering the situation (Frijda, Address correspondence to Maya Tamir, Department of Psychology, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Ave., Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, e-mail: tamirm@bc.edu. PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 324 Volume 19—Number 4 Copyright r 2008 Association for Psychological Science