Homo Oeconomicus 26(2): 235–247 • (2009) www.accedoverlag.de Freedom and Unanticipated Consequences Frank A. Hindriks Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, The Netherlands (eMail: f.a.hindriks@rug.nl ) Abstract Freedom is commonly taken to consist in the absence of constraints. Dowding and van Hees (2007) defend an instance of this view according to which an agent fails to be free to perform a particular action (if and) only if she is intentionally prevented from carrying out that action. Here I consider two ways of understanding what intentional prevention might mean, roughly either intended or anticipated pre- vention. I defend the latter weaker interpretation and argue that it creates a problem for the conception of freedom that Dowding and van Hees defend. I also suggest that the analysis presented can be used to add further detail to the moral responsibility conception of freedom according to which a constraint restricts someone’s freedom exactly if someone is morally responsible for creating or not removing it. Keywords freedom, intentional action, unintended consequences, unanticipated conse- quences, moral responsibility 1. Introduction Freedom is commonly taken to consist in the absence of constraints. In a recent article, Dowding and van Hees (2007) argue that only constraints that are imposed intentionally are relevant to someone’s freedom.1 On the pro- posed view someone is free to perform a particular action exactly if nobody intentionally prevents him or her from performing it. Some regard this as the traditional liberal view of freedom (Kristjánsson 1996: 20). Dowding and van Hees say little about what it might mean to intentionally prevent someone. ey proceed on the assumption that only intended actions are performed intentionally, but note that the term ‘intentional action’ is sometimes used in 1Carter and Kramer (2008) criticize the arguments Dowding and van Hees provide in favour of this view. See Dowding and van Hees (2008) for a reply. © 2009 Accedo Verlagsgesellschaft, München. ISBN 978-3-89265-071-3 ISSN 0943-0180