THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF IMPEACHMENT Aníbal Pérez Liñán Department of Government University of Notre Dame 217 O’Shaughnessy Hall Notre Dame, IN 46556-0368 Perezlinan.1@nd.edu Over the last decade, impeachment has replaced traditional military coups as the standard way to depose presidents in Latin America. Legislatures ousted the president in Brazil (1992), Venezuela (1993), Ecuador (1997), and Paraguay (1999). Other, unsuccessful attempts took place in Perú (1991), and Colombia (1996-7). This paper claims that two institutional factors facilitate (or hinder) the emergence of impeachment: the constitutional provisions for ousting the chief executive, and the president’s ability to control legislators. Those elements are formalized in a simple model, and their historical significance is explored in the cases of Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador. The conclusions suggest that constitutional rules interact with political actors (parties, factions, and leaders) to explain the fall of elected presidents in the 1990s. Prepared for delivery at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Hyatt Regency Miami, March 16-18, 2000. Research for this paper was supported by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies. I am indebted to the people at the Center for Public Opinion Studies (CESOP) at the University of Campinas, CORDES (Quito), IESA (Caracas), the Pontificia Universidade Católica (São Paulo), and the Universidade de Brasília (UnB) for their valuable help.