Theoretical Integration Christfried Jakob’s late views (1930–1949) on the psychogenetic function of the cerebral cortex and its localization: Culmination of the neurophilosophical thought of a keen brain observer Zoë D. Théodoridou, Lazaros C. Triarhou ⇑ Economo-Koskinas Wing for Integrative and Evolutionary Neuroscience, Department of Educational and Social Policy, University of Macedonia, 54006 Thessaloniki, Greece article info Article history: Accepted 14 November 2011 Available online 30 January 2012 Keywords: Neurophilosophy Christfried Jakob Consciousness History of neuroscience abstract This article follows the culmination of the scientific thought of the neurobiologist Christfried Jakob (1866–1956) during the later part of his career, based on publications from 1930 to 1949, when he was between 64 and 83 years of age. Jakob emphasized the necessity of bridging philosophy to the bio- logical sciences, neurobiology in particular. Thus, we consider him as one of the early protagonists in the emergence of neurophilosophy in the 20th century. The topics that occupied his mind were the founda- tions for a future philosophy of the brain, and the ‘neurobiogenetic’, ‘neurodynamic’, and ‘neuropsycho- genetic’ problems in relation to how consciousness emerges. Jakob’s views have many elements in common with great thinkers of philosophy and psychology, including Immanuel Kant, William James, Edmund Husserl, Henri Bergson, Jean Piaget and Willard Quine. A common denominator can also be dis- cerned between Jakob’s dynamic approach and certain aspects of cybernetics and neurophenomenology. Jakob propounded the interdisciplinarity of sciences as an indispensable tool for ultimately solving the enigma of consciousness. Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction With the progress effected in the brain sciences over the past 20 years, traditional philosophical questions have been steered into new directions (Churchland, 2008). Thus, the field of con- sciousness studies has been opened up to a growing body of biol- ogists, neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers (Blackmore, 2005). The investigation of philosophical theories in relation to neuroscientific hypotheses falls within the ‘modern’ domain of neurophilosophy (Northoff, 2004). Formalized by Churchland (1986), the term ‘neurophilosophy’ denotes the interdisciplinary attempt at unifying cognitive neurobiology. In the years following its foundation, neurophilosophy has grown exponentially. Its main theses have centered around: (a) psychological and neuroscientific theories, as well as intertheoretical relationships; (b) the opposi- tion to the autonomy of either psychology or functionalism alone; and (c) a trend of rendering the cognitive neurosciences accessible to and comprehensible by a broader audience (Bickle, 2009, p. 3). On the other hand, philosophy of neuroscience has gradually become a distinguishable field reflecting ‘‘an inquiry into founda- tional (especially epistemic and metaphysical) questions that ap- ply to neuroscience’’ (Bechtel, 2001, p. 7). Such questions can be approached either descriptively, i.e. by depicting how neuroscience proceeds, or normatively, i.e. by implying how neuroscience should proceed (Bickle, Mandik, & Landreth, 2010). The fluidity of the boundaries between neurophilosophy and the philosophy of neuroscience has led Brook and Mandik (2007) and Bickle (2009) to use the term ‘Philosophy and Neuroscience’, which entails ongoing transdisciplinary interactions, accommodat- ing both endeavors. That is the definition we adopt in the present article. Not until recently have philosophers started paying close atten- tion to the data provided by the neurosciences. A few exceptions prior to the 1980s include the work of Nagel (1971), von Eck- ardt-Klein (1975), and Dennett (1978) as pointed out by Brook and Mandik (2007). The establishment and dissemination of reduc- tionistic approaches in the 20th century, prompted to a great ex- tent by Jacques Loeb (1859–1924) and Ivan P. Pavlov (1849– 1936), relegated consciousness studies to philosophy, mysticism or ‘soft’ science, thus diminishing the influence of more integrated contemporary approaches, such as those of Sherrington and Lashey (Greenspan & Baars, 2005). As behaviorists were reacting to the earlier introspection—as exemplified e.g. in the thought of Wundt, James and Freud—with a desire for objectivity, they devised animal experiments, resolutely leaving the human mind out of the picture; 0278-2626/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2011.11.005 ⇑ Corresponding author. Address: University of Macedonia, Egnatia 156, Bldg. Z- 312, 54006 Thessaloniki, Greece. Fax: +30 2310891388. E-mail addresses: zoitheo@uom.gr (Z.D. Théodoridou), triarhou@uom.gr (L.C. Triarhou). Brain and Cognition 78 (2012) 179–188 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Brain and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/b&c