What We Can Reasonably Reject 1 Thomas W. Pogge I. In his recent book, Tim Scanlon is “dealing with three concentric and successively narrower normative domains: reasons, values, and what we owe to each other” 13. 2 The third of these domains, the book’s central subject, is understood as including only a sub- set of what is generally placed under the heading of ‘morality’— namely that “narrower domain of morality having to do with our duties to other people” 6. I will refer to this domain as DDO for ‘domain of duties to others’. Scanlon asserts that “this part of morality comprises a distinct subject matter, unified by a single manner of reasoning and by a common motivational basis” 7. And he adds that these two unifiers of DDO—its single manner of reasoning and its common motivational basis—in turn share a deeper unity, which his contractualist account of DDO seeks to explicate 4, 10–11, 13, 189. Scanlon’s contractualism thus tackles two distinct but related tasks: It tells us how to identify our duties within DDO; and it also characterizes and, as he says, explains what moves agents to attach importance to, and to honor, these moral duties. Each of these two central achievements of Scanlon’s contractu- alism can be condensed into a formula. With regard to the con- Philosophical Issues, 11 Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, 2001 5