Hot or Cold: Is Communicating Anger or Threats More Effective in Negotiation? Marwan Sinaceur INSEAD Gerben A. Van Kleef University of Amsterdam Margaret A. Neale Stanford University Hajo Adam Northwestern University Christophe Haag EM Lyon Is communicating anger or threats more effective in eliciting concessions in negotiation? Recent research has emphasized the effectiveness of anger communication, an emotional strategy. In this article, we argue that anger communication conveys an implied threat, and we document that issuing threats is a more effective negotiation strategy than communicating anger. In 3 computer-mediated negotiation experi- ments, participants received either angry or threatening messages from a simulated counterpart. Exper- iment 1 showed that perceptions of threat mediated the effect of anger (vs. a control) on concessions. Experiment 2 showed that (a) threat communication elicited greater concessions than anger communi- cation and (b) poise (being confident and in control of one’s own feelings and decisions) ascribed to the counterpart mediated the positive effect of threat compared to anger on concessions. Experiment 3 replicated this positive effect of threat over anger when recipients had an attractive alternative to a negotiated agreement. These findings qualify previous research on anger communication in negotiation. Implications for the understanding of emotion and negotiation are discussed. Keywords: anger, negotiation, conflict, threat, emotion communication The use of anger and the use of threats are two common strategies in negotiation (e.g., Barry, 1999). Anecdotes suggest that both are effective. For example, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was persuasive because of his ability to communicate anger, according to French President Charles De Gaulle (De Gaulle, 1954/1964, pp. 57–58). U.S. President John F. Kennedy used threats effectively during the Cuban Missile Crisis, declaring an ultimatum to the Soviets while appearing poised in a televised address on October 22, 1962 (Schlesinger, 1965, pp. 832– 840). Although anger and threats may both seem effective strategies in negotiation, it is not clear whether the more emotional strategy or the colder strategy is more effective. In this article, we examine this question: Is communicating anger or threats more effective in eliciting concessions in negotiation? In doing so, we bridge two streams in negotiation and conflict research that evolved indepen- dently: recent research on emotions and classic literature on threats. Anger Communication in Negotiation Affect in general (e.g., Elfenbein, 2007; Forgas & George, 2001) and emotional communication in particular (Barry, 2008) have become important areas in negotiation research. Of the var- ious emotions that may be communicated in negotiations, anger is one of the most prominent (Allred, 1999; Barry, 1999; Daly, 1991; Van Kleef, Van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck, & Van Beest, 2008). Drawing on the idea that emotional communication can be strate- gic (Barry, 1999; Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Kopelman, Ro- sette, & Thompson, 2006; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999), recent research has investigated the effectiveness of anger com- munication in negotiation. It has found that communicating anger (compared to a control condition or to communicating happiness) can be an effective strategy in eliciting concessions from a coun- terpart in negotiation (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008; Van Kleef & Co ˆte ´, 2007; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, 2004b, 2010). This article was published Online First June 20, 2011. Marwan Sinaceur, Department of Organizational Behavior, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France; Gerben A. Van Kleef, Department of Social Psy- chology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Margaret A. Neale, Department of Organizational Behavior, Stanford University; Hajo Adam, Department of Management & Organizations, Northwestern University; Christophe Haag, Department of Management, EM Lyon, Lyon, France. This research was generously funded by the INSEAD Alumni Fund (INSEAD Grant 2520-306) through an INSEAD R&D Committee Grant that was awarded to Marwan Sinaceur. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Marwan Sinaceur, INSEAD, Department of Organizational Behavior, Boulevard de Constance, 77300 Fontainebleau, France. E-mail: marwan.sinaceur@ insead.edu Journal of Applied Psychology © 2011 American Psychological Association 2011, Vol. 96, No. 5, 1018 –1032 0021-9010/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0023896 1018