Fadi Bitar 1 Reading through the works of existentialists, one would realize that anxiety tends to be explained similarly to: the state-of-mind that freedom depends on. An account of each of these philosophers’ works on anxiety would give one an overview of how anxiety is derived, defined, applied to form arguments, and its relationship to fear. This framework will help one manifest a methodical conclusion as to which philosopher’s argument is consistent and supported with evidence (if any). Heidegger’s account of ‘mood’ is not similar to the mainstream psychological definition. Moods are not inner or outer states of being-in-the-world. According to Heidegger, moods are more like an attachment of the Being of Dasein. In other words, moods exist insofar as there is an entity whose Being allows a mood to encompass it. Heidegger claims that the ability of moods to change or worsen is an important establishment for Being. Moods stem (ontologically) from states-of-mind. Fear is the aspect of the Being of Dasein that applies only when the object of fear is in proximity of that Being. Basically, an object is necessary for one to be fearful since the object is not threatening unless it is close to that Being. For example, one that is fearful of dogs cannot be in a state of fear unless a dog (the object) is in range of that Being. “That which fear fears about is the very entity which is afraid - Dasein,” (Being and Time 30: 141). To elaborate, Dasein is the subject of the fear and it is fear itself. Different forms of fear are not compared using degrees, they are compared with the use of distinct ‘modes’. For example, fearing-about is a possibility without being-afraid. Elaborating, fearing for Others is a state-of-mind that is shared with the Other, but does not necessarily include being-afraid-with (BT 30: 142).