ihs.com Page 1 of 11 © Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. Understanding Boko Haram's factional structure Date Posted: 24-May-2016 Author: Atta Barkindo Publication: Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor Boko Haram is typically understood and evaluated as a singular, discrete entity, overlooking the fact that it instead comprises multiple factions with differing objectives and outlooks. Atta Barkindo examines the history and factional composition of Boko Haram, which has become particularly significant following the pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015. Key Points  Nigerian militant Islamist group Boko Haram is commonly perceived as a unified, homogenous entity, but it is in fact composed of multiple factions.  A failure to understand this, the interconnections among the factions, and the nuances of Islamist militancy in Nigeria have detrimentally affected the ability of the Nigerian state to tackle the group, although there are some signs that this is beginning to change.  Collaboration between Boko Haram and the Islamic State has been more significant than is widely recognised, and has increased Boko Haram's regional appeal, recruitment, and procurement ability. Since the transformation of Boko Haram into an organised non-state armed group in 2009, IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) has recorded the killing of more than 8,500 people by the group - although the true figure is probably far higher - along with the reported displacement of more than five million civilians from northeastern Nigeria. However, most commentators and security analysts, within and outside Nigeria, continue to present Boko Haram as a homogenous group. In particular, the leadership of the group has been perceived to be a singular entity throughout its evolution. Consequently, every attack has been attributed to a 'single' Boko Haram, and the different factions that comprise the group and their differing motivations, objectives, and outlooks have not been recognised. Importantly, this perception has dictated the policy of extensive military deployment - including the use of the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF), mercenaries, local hunters, and vigilantes - against the group without identifying its different factions. The inability to categorise factions within Boko Haram has meant that Nigeria's response to Boko Haram has been heavily military driven, as government efforts to detect moderate voices and select individuals and factions for negotiations have made little progress. This failure has undermined the government's ability in identifying moderates, winning them over, and cutting off Boko Haram's channel of membership expansion. Furthermore, it has damaged the government's efforts to understand the distinct ideology central to each faction and how to treat each faction accordingly. There is now, however, some evidence to suggest that the government is taking a more multifaceted and slightly softer approach to dealing with the group. This report examines the different splinter groups that have emerged over the years within Boko Haram, highlighting linkages, leadership struggles, and ideological differences between each. Furthermore, it analyses the pledge of allegiance by the largest faction to the Islamic State, and