EUGENE SCHLOSSBERGER AND RON TALMAGE WHY ACTIONS MIGHT BEWILLINGS (Received in revised form 19 November, 1979) Prichard's claims in 'Acting, willing, desiring' have been widely discussed in recent years. Most action theorists (including Melden and Davidson) object to the introduction of willings. Others advance independent arguments for the claim that all actions are willings. In either case, Prichard's reasoning goes ignored; amidst all this discussion, very little attention has been paid to Prichard's argument. 1 This is both unfortunate and understandable. For it is not easy to discern the argument in Prichard's remarks. Yet proper reconstruc- tion shows that Prichard is offering a strong argument that a certain from of dualism, coupled with an 'austerity' principle, leads to the concludion that all actions are willings. 2 This is a somewhat surprising result. Moreover, when stripped of its dualist assumptions, Prichards's argument yields the Davidsonian conclusion that all actions are bodily movements. It is not surprising that Prichard's argument has been overlooked. For he makes a number of claims which (despite his use of such idioms as 'conse- quently, there seems to be no resisting the conclusion...') do not seem to form an argument. In the course of his paper, Prichard makes the following claims (listed in order of appearance): actions are activities, and there is no activity of causing. Further, it 'goes without saying' that actions are mental activities, namely willings. And willings are unique mental activities that cause bodily movements. Prichard also holds that effects of my activities are not (parts of) activities of mine (the austerity thesis), s that willing some change in the word constitutes 'butting into' the physical world, and that trying to move my hand is an action of the same sort as moving my hand. It is not at all clear which of these are premises and which are conclusiolas. When suitably re-arranged, however, a powerful argument emerges. Reconstruction of Prichard's argument begins with the real~.ation that Prichard is operating within the framework of a particular version of dualism. For Prichard, agents are minds. There is a good deal of textual evidence that this thesis is one of Prichard's basic assumptions. For example, he writes (on Philosophical Studies 38 (1980) 199-203. 0031-8t16/80/0382-0199500.50 Copyright 9 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.