Working Paper Series No. 2008-WP5 Can co-management improve ? e c r u o s e r l o o p - n o m m o c a f o e c n a n r e v o g Lessons from a framed ﬁeld experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean Rocío del Pilar Moreno-Sánchez, Jorge Higinio Maldonado June, 2008 Abstract/Resumen Complexities associated with the management of common pool resources (CPR) threaten governance at some marine protected areas (MPA). In this paper, using economic experimental games (EEG), we investigate the effects of both external regulation and the complementarities between internal regulation and non-coercive authority intervention—what we call co- management—on ﬁshermen’s extraction decisions. We perform EEG with ﬁshermen inhabiting the inﬂuence zone of an MPA in the Colombian Caribbean. The results show that co- management exhibits the best results, both in terms of resource sustainability and reduction in extraction, highlighting the importance of strategies that recognize communities as key actors in the decision-making process for the sustainable use and conservation of CPR in protected areas. Key words: Common-pool resources, governance, co-management, experimental economic games, ﬁsheries, Latin America. This work is used with the permission of Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program. © 2008, Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program.