To Unite or Not to Unite – That is Not the Question: The 1963 Tripartite Unity Talks Reassessed ELIE PODEH On 17 April 1963, after three rounds of negotiations, Egypt, Syria and Iraq announced their intention to establish a federal union called the United Arab Republic (al-Jumhuriyya al-‘Arabiyya al-Muttahida), the same name as the defunct 1958 Egyptian–Syrian union. The signatories stipulated that the decision to establish the federation would have to be ratified by popular plebiscites in all three countries on 17 September 1963, and that a transitional period of 20 months was to elapse before the federation would become a reality. 1 Students of contemporary Arab history are familiar with this episode, known as the 1963 Unity Talks. This scholarly familiarity derives, inter alia, from the rarity in modern Arab history of access to original official documents. It is generally agreed that the protocols of the talks, published by Egypt three months thereafter, are largely authentic. Yet, evidence shows that certain discussions were excluded from the transcripts. 2 Furthermore, the very existence of such a valuable source affected scholarship on the episode in two significant ways. First, rare access to the actual deliberations prompted researchers to concentrate on a textual analysis of the negotiations. Second, the studies focused on the three participants only, assessing the linkage between the negotiations and the domestic political scene in each state. Consequently, a curiously monolithic version emerged in the literature. 3 What is strikingly absent in the extant studies is any analysis of the impact of the 1963 unity talks on the broader Arab system. Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait and the North African countries – especially Algeria – were each affected by the tripartite unity talks. Their positions, in turn, helped determine the fate of the federation and its demise. Moreover, the impact of the 1963 Unity Talks was not confined to the Arab world; it also significantly affected the Israeli position, which, in turn, affected the course of events in the Arab system. It is these regional Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.39, No.1, January 2003, pp.150–185 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON 391mes06.qxd 18/12/02 08:38 Page 150