Understanding contracts in evolving agro-economies: Fermers, dekhqans and networks in Khorezm, Uzbekistan Utkur Djanibekov a, * , Kristof Van Assche b, a , Daan Boezeman c , Nodir Djanibekov d a Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Str. 3, 53113 Bonn, Germany b Wageningen University, Droevendaalsesteeg 4, 6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands c Institute for Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen, Thomas van Aquinostraat 3.1.58, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands d Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), Theodor-Lieser-Str. 2, 06120 Halle (Saale), Germany Keywords: Agricultural contracts Actor-networks Institutional economics Bimodal agricultural system Transitional agricultural systems abstract We combine institutional economic perspectives and actor-network theory to elucidate the role of contracts in the evolution of transitional agricultural systems. Such combination of theories can shed a light on the mutual constitution of actors and institutions, and the formation of economic strategies. We argue that forms and functions of contracts can only be understood in an evolutionary context. In a case study of the Khorezm region, Uzbekistan, where several waves of reform created two principal actors e commercial farms (called fermers locally) responsible for state-ordered production and semi-subsistence smallholders (called dekhqans locally) e it is demonstrated how in the self-transformation of the actor- network, and thus the shifts in forms and roles of contracts, several network features play a role: in- terdependencies between the actors, the essential actant of the irrigation and drainage system, formal/ informal dialectics. Time horizons, risk/benefit calculations, trust and cooperation forms emerge in the self-reproducing network and leave space for certain contractual forms and functions. Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Contracts have many forms and functions (Murrell, 1983; Roumasset, 1995; Sen, 2011). In this paper, we focus on the forms and functions of agricultural contracts as they emerge in rural transition economies. This, we believe, is instructive for two rea- sons. Firstly, the transitional context sheds a new light on the functions, and therefore the nature of contracts. Secondly, the study of contracting in rural transitions adds to the understanding of this transition. We develop an approach that is radically evolutionary: rural societies are in a constant evolution. Actors and institutions, and notably contracts mediating and coordinating actors, are the product of and constitutive for the same evolution. This perspective on contracts and contracting as part of reor- ganizing networks of production and governance (cf. Suchman, 2003; Veldwisch and Bock, 2011) can conceptually embed clas- sical contract theory in such a way that it becomes useful in more different contexts. In a mainstream contract theory, contractual arrangements are formed through the mutual agreement between actors (in our case commercial farm and smallholder), eventually leading to some form of optimality (Craswell, 2003; Posner, 2002). The neo-classical orthodoxy (for an overview see Smith, 2004) has been criticized by North (2006) and others for its assumptions of stability, transparency and certainty of exchange (De Soto, 2000; Macneil, 2000; Teubner, 1993). Many non-western contexts do not share the stable institutions, specialized roles and social contracts between citizens and state that define separation of powers and specify a form of ‘rule of law’ (Easterly, 2006; Rosen, 2006). Thus, those who contract, the process of contracting and the contracts themselves cannot be understood in isolation from that unstable context; what is optimized by means of the contract can shift and the same holds true for the effects of the contract, e.g., its enforceability (Elster et al., 1998; Hann, 2003). Posner (2002) speaks of the inability of economic contract theory to explain legal evolutions, Macneil (2000) underlines the necessity to un- derstand ‘contracting worlds’, and Teubner (1993) refers to the ‘networks behind the contracts’. Our proposal for a conceptual embedding of contract theory that renders it more widely useful is a combination of institutional economics and actor-network theory (ANT). For institutional economics, we lean on the works of North (2006), Greif (2006), Seabright (2010), and Acemo glu and Robinson (2012), while our ANT approach derives from Latour (1996a,b, 2004), Callon (1998) and Fuchs (2001). The new frame * Corresponding author. Tel.: þ49 228731852; fax: þ49 228731869. E-mail addresses: utkurdjanibekov@yahoo.com, utkur@uni-bonn.de (U. Djanibekov), kristof.vanassche@wur.nl (K. Van Assche), d.boezeman@fm.ru.nl (D. Boezeman), djanibekov@iamo.de (N. Djanibekov). Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Journal of Rural Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jrurstud 0743-0167/$ e see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2013.05.003 Journal of Rural Studies 32 (2013) 137e147