Disagreement and the Rationality of Religious Belief I. Introduction In this paper I do two things: (i) apply the Equal Weight View to cases of religious disagreement, and (ii) evaluate some consequences of that application for the rationality of religious beliefs. With regard to (i), I argue that the Equal Weight View has it that awareness of the current state of disagreement over religious propositions, such as the claim that God exists, gives us a defeater for any non-skeptical attitude toward such propositions (both for theistic and atheistic doxastic attitudes). With regard to (ii), I examine what this entails for the rationality religious beliefs. In particular, I examine how troubling the theist should find these consequences, and argue that they are not as troubling as is typically thought. II. The Epistemology of Disagreement The epistemology of disagreement concerns how discovering that another individual disagrees with you about some claim should affect what you believe about that claim. Discussion of the epistemic significance of disagreement typically takes place in two ways: examining peer disagreements and examining more general everyday disagreements. While there are a number of distinct conceptions of epistemic peers in the literature, the central feature of all of these accounts is that epistemic peers are a kind of epistemic equal. Epistemic peers about p are in an equally good epistemic position with respect to p – they are equally likely to be correct about p. Three questions lie at the heart of the debate concerning the epistemic significance of peer disagreement, and the various views on the epistemic significance of disagreement can be distinguished in terms of how they answer each of these questions. 1 1 This follows (blinded for review a and b).