Hypatia vol. 31, no. 1 (Winter 2016) © by Hypatia, Inc. Thinking with Beauvoir on the Freedom of the Child LIOR LEVY Among philosophers, Simone de Beauvoir is unique in treating childhood as a philosophical phenomenon. In both The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, she examines the relationship between childhood and human freedom and considers its role in the development of subjectivity. Despite this, few sustained analyses of her treatment of the phenomenon exist. I argue that Beauvoir’s conception of childhood is not uniform, but changes from The Ethics of Ambiguity to The Second Sex. Whereas the former presents children as lacking moral freedom, as not fully sovereign individuals, the latter suggests that children are just as free as adults. When children do not fully possess or exercise freedom, it is not because they are not in a position to do so, but rather because various social institutions hinder them. I find this position useful for developing a phenomenological account of childhood as a site for freedom. Hence, Beauvoir becomes a source for thinking of issues in philosophical anthropol- ogy concerning the temporality of human existence and the nature of human agency over a lifespan. INTRODUCTION Childhood is a recurring theme in Simone de Beauvoir’s work: she recalls her own childhood in her autobiographies; examines its role in the constitution and develop- ment of human freedom in The Ethics of Ambiguity; and studies it in relation to the construction of femininity in The Second Sex. Despite this, few sustained analyses of her treatment of the phenomenon exist. Many comment, often in passing, on her uniqueness for considering childhood as a philosophical theme (Bergoffen 1995, 182– 83; Eshleman 2009, 86–87, n. 35). Discussions tend to focus on her account of child- hood in The Second Sex, particularly on the ways in which her analysis informs other issues on her philosophical agenda: for instance, how it allows her to present freedom as situated and achieved over time (rather than absolute). Little, if any, is said about her treatment of childhood as a phenomenon in its own right. 1 Furthermore, perhaps