DELAY IN CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS: A SYSTEMIC MALAISE DEBI S. SAINI 1 This paper argues that the realistic cause of delay in conciliation proceedings should be located in the dynamics of actual disputing experiences and not just the averagings, perceptions and opinions analyses. The delay is merely a symptom of a deeper systemic malaise in the framework of the conciliation-adjudication model, with over-arching powers vested with the state machinery. The paper proceeds to explain the perceptions as well as the real causes for delay. It is based on a sociological reconstruction of 33 collective industrial disputes in the private sector. In 4 cases, the live conciliation proceedings were observed by the author. The dispute files or all the cases were studied for reconstruction. Representatives of disputant parties (management and workmen) were interviewed. Introduction The key mediatory mechanism provided for the resolution of industrial conflict under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA) is the conciliation machinery. The Conciliation Officer (CO) is one of the authorities provided for in Chapter II of the IDA. This Act assigns to the conciliation machinery the role of “mediating” in and “promoting the settlement” of industrial disputes. Towards this objective, the IDA enjoins the CO to “without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and right settlement thereof and … do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the Dispute.” 1 It has been provided that the CO shall submit his report within 14 days of the commencement of conciliation proceedings. However, subject to the approval of the CO, the time for submission of the report may be extended by such period as may be agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the dispute. 2 What is the rationale of providing a time limit for the conclusion of conciliation proceedings in a conciliation legislation like the IDA? Three main reasons have been advanced for the imposition of such a limitation (Sinha and Sinha, 1986: 284). Firstly, conciliation is expected to provide a cooling-off period, during which emotional tensions may subside and a settlement can be arrived at, Secondly, parties should not be deprived, for a long period, of the freedom to settle their disputes even by causing work-stoppages. Thirdly, it presumes that if an early break-through is not achieved in conciliation, it is not very likely to succeed later. It is a well-known fact that the 14 days time limit is observed more in its violation. Why? Scholars have not quite gone into the real reasons for this state of affairs. Aggregate data are often put forth to show the working of the conciliation machinery (Patil, 1977; Pradip Kumar, 1966), or parties’ perceptions are used as methods for testing its efficacy (Murty et al., 1986). Some studies have exhorted that “conciliators should develop commitment to their job” (Murty et al., 1986: 438). There are others which suggest the disputant parties to be “determined to abide by law” (Kher, 1985: 99) if they want industrial peace. Such observations, it should be noted, presume the “ineffectiveness syndrome” as merely an attitudinal problem, without looking at it as a manifestation of a wider malaise. Contemporary scholarship has also begun to suggest that 1 Dr. Debi S Saini is Professor of Labour Law, Gandhi Labour Institute, Manav Mandir Road, Ahmedabad 380052.