Penultimate version, forthcoming in: Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy vol. 2 Domination and the Rule of Law Assaf Sharon The rule of law is often advocated as a solution to the tension between au- thority and liberty. Political liberty, so the claim, is primarily the absence of domination and the rule of law, though authoritative, does not dominate. This argument has been articulated most elaborately by contemporary re- publican (or neo-Roman) theorists, who identify domination with the po- tential for arbitrary interference. I argue, 1 first, that their arguments employ an unsustainable concept of arbitrariness. And, second, that insofar as indi- vidual liberty is concerned, singling out arbitrary interferences is misguided. 1. Law and liberty How can the legitimate wielding of coercive force by political authorities be reconciled with individual liberty? This is among the most fundamental questions of political philosophy. A common strategy of reply employs the rule of law. “As in absolute governments the King is law, so in free coun- tries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other,” Thomas Paine wrote. Locke famously said that “where there’s no law there’s no freedom,” and that “where law ends, tyranny begins.” Hayek, to take a more recent example, claimed that “When we obey laws... we are not sub- ject to another man’s will and are therefore free,” while Rawls asserted that “the rule of law is obviously closely related to liberty.” 2 One can quote 1. Versions of this chapter were presented at the Law and Philosophy Workshop at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at the Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy 2014 Workshop. I am grateful to participants in both forums for their insightful comments. Particular thanks to Andrew Lister and Peter Vallentyne for their helpful questions and suggestions. I also thank Joshua Cohen, David Enoch, Alon Harel, David Hills, Nadeem Hussain, Debra Satz, and Naomi Sussmann for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 2. Paine (1997 ); Locke (1988 : §57, §202); Hayek (1978: 153); Rawls (1999: 207).