Logique & Analyse 225 (2014), 15–44 THE PERFORMATIVE CONTRADICTION AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DEVICE: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS REACH AND SCOPE JOSÉ ANTONIO ERRÁZURIZ ABSTRACT The notion of performative contradiction is widely used today — and not exclu- sively in philosophical contexts — as an argumentative device capable of unveiling the discursive inadmissibility of certain kinds of statements in a rather conclusive way. The growing popularity of this notion has not however been accompanied by a clear elucidation of its actual argumentative value (i.e. of the underlying reasons that make it a valuable argumentative device). The following article attempts to provide an initial analysis which could eventually lead to, or at least awake an interest in, the accomplishment of this philosophical task. This attempt consists in 1). a brief exposition of some ancestors of the performative contradiction (an expo- sition that should illustrate the intuition underlying this notion) and 2). a descrip- tion that intends to answer the question: What exactly happens when we commit a performative contradiction? I shall try to make the case for a restricted use of the notion of performative contradiction. As such, a polemic posture towards its most prominent defender (Karl-Otto Apel) will be adopted. When involved in argumentative controversies we sometimes place our trust concerning the developments of the argument in algorithm-like resources which should enable us to both exhibit the plausibility of our arguments and/or denunciate the implausibility of those of our opponents. I call these resources ‘algorithm-like’ because they somehow fulfill the general definition of the nowadays popular concept of algorithm: given a certain input (an argument, in this particular case) they offer a set of fairly well-defined instructions indicating the way in which the argument should be treated (i.e. analyzed) in order to produce the desired output. We thus sometimes employ argumentative devices such as the reduction to the absurd (reductio ad absurdum), the regressus in infinitum (infinite regress), the so-called begging the question (petitio principii) the modus ponendo ponens (the way that affirms by affirming), etc. as reliable (logic-based) ways to prove our point. Now the use of this kind of argumentative device synthesizes and facilitates the exhibition of ills and virtues of arguments that would otherwise demand much more effort and time (possibly without the same amount of argumentative effectiveness) and shall thus be regarded