Jonathan Rauh is a doctoral candidate at the University of South Carolina. His interests include ethics and accountability, education policy, and health policy. His work has appeared in Public Organization Review, Administration & Society, and Education Policy Analysis Archives. In his current position, he works in regulatory affairs for the health insurance industry. E-mail: wjrauh@gmail.com 98 Public Administration Review • January | February 2015 Public Administration Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 1, pp. 98–110. © 2014 by The American Society for Public Administration. DOI: 10.1111/puar.12290. Jonathan Rauh University of South Carolina Abstract: is article explores the ability of elected officials to affect the autonomy of state ethics commissions. e author examines autonomy as a function of the capacity of ethics commissions to control their finances and personnel decisions and how the presence or absence of that capacity affects whether bureaucratic structures can function inde- pendently of politics. Using data from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation, the analysis extends previous arguments concerning political actors’ desire to affect ethics commissions. Findings suggest that elected officials use their positions to control the makeup of commission leadership and financial resources, with the goal of decreasing commissions’ ability to act autonomously. Practitioner Points • Ensuring that those who are monitored do not control appointments is essential for reducing political interference on ethics commissions. • It is necessary to set positive standards of required experience for serving as a commissioner rather than just relying on negative standards for who may not serve. • A commission with a higher budget relative to its required tasks will likely be more autonomous. Constituencies expect ethics commissions to provide oversight of their public and elected officials. In a white paper for the National Conference of State Legislatures, Comlossy states that ethics commis- sions “work to ensure voters’ trust in policymakers and political institutions by monitoring compliance with ethics laws and ensuring ethical conduct by those under their jurisdiction” (2011, 1). Commissions serve as watch- dogs for the public; they ensure that conflicts of interest are exposed, financial dealings are done “in the daylight,” and the decision-making process is transparent. In practice, however, ethics commissions are primarily compliance organizations that set mini- mum standards for what is acceptable (Smith 2003b). Most commissions lack strong mandates but also can only interpret what is ethical according to set rules and guidelines. Ethics commissions and most ethics policies have been born of scandals (Rosenson 2003)—the trend of creating state ethics commis- sions can be traced to Watergate. Ethics policies, therefore, tend to be responsive and do not reflect the true preferences of elected officials (see Anechiarico Predicting Political Influence on State Ethics Commissions: Of Course We Are Ethical—Nudge Nudge, Wink Wink P olitical influence over ethics commissions is an important topic in thinking about the legiti- macy of these commissions. However, politi- cal influence over ethics commissions presents some sticky problems for the current literature on bureau- cratic autonomy. No bureaucracy has the authority to make its own mandate, but it is important that some have greater autonomy than oth- ers. Ethics commissions do not usually regulate the providers of public goods or other private entities; instead, they target elected and public officials, that is, those who make public policy. erefore, it is desirable that ethics commis- sions have broad mandates; have the authority, fund- ing, and capacity to accomplish those mandates; and be able to do so without ex ante or ex post pressure from elected officials. Commissions are politically empowered institu- tions that have a responsibility to monitor those who empower them. is power and the ability of commis- sions to harm elected officials both economically and politically may give elected officials an incentive to exert control over ethics commissions. No bureaucracy has the author- ity to make its own mandate, but it is important that some have greater autonomy than others.