1 Bioethics and the Challenge of the Ecological Individual By Jonathan Beever and Nicolae Morar 1 The question of individuality has occupied the forefront of philosophical, biological, ecological, and ethical research. Numerous domains of inquiry are traditionally predicated upon recognizing discrete entities in the world whose behavior can be measured and whose value can be meaningfully ascribed. In this paper we consider a series of biological, cognitive, and social challenges to the metaphysical concept of individuality as the ground of the psychological-individual, or self. In order to show why the cumulative effects of various challenges to the self are genuine philosophical concerns, we introduce a core distinction between causation and constitution. We then pinpoint the ethical consequences of taking seriously this potential dismantlement of individuality. We claim that, given its intrinsic dynamism, an ecological conception of individuality renders ascriptions of autonomy to selves highly improbable - or even meaningless. Last, we find conceptual resources in the work of environmental philosopher Arne Naess and show how his distinction between shallow and deep responses helps us rethink the notion of individuality, and thus, assess whether the conceptual and normative coherence of human autonomy could, at least partially, be salvaged. Part 1: Challenges to human individuality Human individuality has been understood by 19 th and 20 th century philosophy and psychology as consisting of either discrete organisms made only of human biochemical and genetic components, or distinct minds whose cognitive functioning was internalized and detached from outside resources, or as selves radically separated from the social relations they inhabit. In this first section of this essay we highlight three critiques of these historical conceptions of human individuality. The major contribution of this section does not consist in reiterating a biological, cognitive-psychological or social critique of individuality; but rather, it consists in recognizing the important effects of these critiques taken cumulatively. First, we believe that any critique of individuality should not be limited to a critique of isolated aspects of selves. While critiques of the self set up a radical challenge to human individuality, they remain psychological in nature and thus not entirely cognizant of the embodied and biological nature of individuality and agency. Second, even if each of 1 Names are listed in alphabetical order and reflect equal contribution to the paper.