Fictionalism about Fictional Characters Stuart Brock Western Washington University Despite protestations to the contrary, philosophers have always been renowned for espousing theories that do violence to common-sense opinion. In the last twenty years or so there has been a growing number of philosophers keen to follow in this tradition. According to these philosophers, if a story of pure fic- tion tells us that an individual exists, then there really is such an individual. According to these realists about fictional characters, ‘Scarlett O’Hara,’ ‘Char- lie Brown,’ ‘Batman,’ ‘Superman,’ ‘Tweedledum’ and ‘Tweedledee’ are not denotationless terms, but names that really refer. What is truly surprising about this situation is that almost no one has inveighed against this unfortunate real- ist tendency. My aim here will be to challenge this new orthodoxy, and to defend an anti-realist position against the arguments proffered by the realist. 1. Realism about Fictional Characters Realism about fictional characters is not a single unified theory. Its tenets are many and varied. What unifies realists is their acceptance of the following two theses: Ontological Thesis : There are fictional characters. A fictional character is an individual ~or role! picked out by a name or description which ~ i ! is first introduced in a work of fiction, and ~ ii ! does not pick out a concrete individual in the actual world. Principle of Plenitude : There is an abundance of fictional characters. Sometimes a work of fiction makes reference to robust real-world individuals such as Napoleon, Macbeth, or Joan of Arc. Such individuals are, in a sense, fictional characters in so far as they are individuals referred to in a work of fiction. Most philosophers are committed to the existence of such individuals, NOÛS 36:1 ~2002! 1–21 © 2002 Blackwell Publishing Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK. 1