WAYNE D. RIGGS BEYOND TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD: THE REAL VALUE OF KNOWING THAT P (Received 14 September 2000) ABSTRACT. Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goals of believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations. On such a view, (call it the “TG view”) the only evaluations that count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluate something (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitive trait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to these two goods. In particular, this view implies that all the epistemic value of knowledge must be derived from the value of the two goals cited in TG. I argue that this implication is false, and thus that the TG view must be abandoned. I propose a candidate to replace the TG view that makes better sense of the value of knowledge. 1. INTRODUCTION There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion – ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown very little concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid error – these are our first and great commandments as would-be knowers ... – William James 1 Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goals of believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspira- tions. The very borders of the epistemological realm are often demarcated by just these two considerations. On such a view, the only evaluations that count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluate something (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitive trait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to these two goods. The proposed connections will vary from one view to the next, but the conviction remains that what makes an issue epistemological is that, at bottom, it has to do with believing truths and avoiding errors. For ease of reference later, let us call this the “Twin Goods View” (hereafter “TG”). Philosophical Studies 107: 87–108, 2002. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.